How do leftist governments negotiate the trade-off between courting union support and maintaining the business sector’s trust? Scholars have argued that leftist parties will remain accountable to their labor base when powerful unions have strong ties to centralized leftist parties. However, I argue that strong party-union ties and party leadership centralization may, in fact, insulate leftist presidents against redistributive pressures from below. When party-union ties allow labor leaders to develop careers as professional politicians, these leaders become more responsive to the party’s goals than to their union base. Further, a centralized party organization can exclude unions and leftist factions from the design of redistributive policies. To test my argument, I use a case study of Brazil under the administration of the Worker’s Party (PT).

A redistributive wave across Latin America provided credence to existing explanations that emphasize the importance of democracy and the political left for democratic redistribution. Yet, neither of these theories tells the entire story behind the contemporary politics of inequality in Latin America. This article stresses the importance of party systems for democratic redistribution, especially their role in increasing the scope of social policy as well as igniting competitive electoral environments that incentivize political elites to redistribute, leading to the amelioration of inequality over time. Utilizing a time-series cross-sectional dataset on fifteen Latin American countries covering the period of 1990–2015, and extending the analysis to sixty-five global democracies, this article finds that countries with institutionalized party systems exhibit greater income redistribution and lower levels of inequality than those with inchoate counterparts.

Under what conditions do trade unions participate in elections during democratic transitions? Conventional explanations focus on unions’ economic interests, organizational power, and militancy in the lead-up to democratization. The behavior of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), however, challenges these expectations. Despite its organizational strength and prominent role in the country’s transition, as well as the presence of economic incentives for participation, the UGTT has eschewed formal electoral participation. This article leverages this case to theorize an additional factor shaping electoral behavior: internal cohesion. Drawing on in-depth interviews with union leaders and original survey data of union members, we show how the threat of internal fragmentation acts as a powerful internal constraint, even in situations where unions are otherwise well-positioned to engage in elections.

How do state-business relations interact with outward investment in authoritarian regimes? This article focuses on the importance of domestic political status and specifically business’ vulnerability to the state in explaining the dynamics of China’s outward investments. I present three types of domestic capital whose economic and political logics differ as they go abroad: tactical capital pursues political power and prestige, competitive capital pursues commercial goals, and crony capital seeks refuge from the state and asset expatriation. The Chinese regime’s approach to outward investment, which I characterize as mobilization campaigns adjusted over time and combined with targeted domestic regulation, endeavors to treat these different kinds of capital differently, deploying and disciplining tactical capital, enabling competitive capital, and constraining crony capital.

How do autocrats manage civil society? I develop a typology of authoritarian responses to civil society and show how leaders employ selective policies to adjudicate among risks and benefits in the third sector. Using data on laws managing foreign support of civil society in China and Russia, I find evidence of selective implementation that reveals which groups are seen as threatening or beneficial. While there are some similarities across the two countries, I find a divergence in their response to environmental groups, who are selectively repressed or neglected in Russia but selectively encouraged or co-opted in China. Using fieldwork interviews, I conduct a case study to show that while environmental groups in both countries pose some risk, the key difference is their perceived benefit.

Islamic law denotes as haram any forbidden behavior, object, beverage, or food. Despite subscribing to a similar Salafi ideology, very few jihadi groups use violence against haram targets (e.g., brothels, casinos, statues, liquor stores, mixed sex schools, and gay clubs). This study argues that haram-centered violence unites ethnically-mixed jihadi groups by fostering a superordinate Islamic identity that enables them to overcome their collective action problems. As a result, ethnically-mixed Salafi jihadi groups deploy haram targeting much more than homogenous ones. Using new disaggregated group-level data, our analyses demonstrate that the ethnic structure of Salafi jihadi groups shapes haram targeting, both in Dagestan and on a global scale. The article discusses these findings and directions for future research on religious violence.

Sustaining positive attitudes toward refugees is a priority as refugee crises surge worldwide. This study draws on eighty-five in-depth interviews with citizens in four provinces across Turkey. We identified prominent frames from Turkish political discourse and asked individuals to recount their self-narratives of attitude formation about Syrian refugees. We find that most respondents’ narratives included multiple frames, confirming that attitudes are often products of contradictory factors. Furthermore, humanitarianism and shared religion, frames thought to support positive attitudes, did not have such straightforward associations here. Humanitarianism was a positive force early, but had limits as compassion fatigue set in, and respondents described polarizing differences in religious practices rather than shared religion. Our work highlights the importance of examining attitude formation in non-Western settings for understanding views about and supporting societal inclusion of refugees.

In the past decade, political violence research has been deeply shaped by the “ethnopolitical exclusion” model of conflict, a research tradition that emphasizes the group-level mechanisms connecting ethnic identity to conflict processes. This review article examines three recent books that represent a new wave of scholarship that studies how different social, political, and institutional processes give rise to ethnically-organized violence. These works make several notable contributions. They move beyond static, structuralist approaches for understanding the emergence of ethnic “grievances” and focus attention on the dynamic processes and state policies that amplify or curb the political salience of ethnic appeals. They also shed new light on the nuanced role that ethnic demographic distributions play in the onset and termination of intrastate conflict.

The massification of secondary schooling constitutes the key educational project of the first post-war period. However, the resulting educational structures differed in terms of streaming and standardization. Despite their historical opposition to such expansion, center-right parties contributed to shaping these reforms. They generally opposed standardization because their distributive strategy rested on support from elites and middle classes. However, their stance on streaming varied. Centre-right parties supported streaming when they were linked to teachers and private providers who opposed comprehensive reforms, but supported de-streaming where such groups aligned with the left. This article shows how center-right parties in Bavaria, France, and Italy, with common partisan distributive aims, introduced varied public service reforms following from their links to different vested producers. It argues that theorizing such reforms requires considering both distributive and productive environments.

The increasing critique of representative democracy and its institutions determined reformers to consider the direct and deliberative processes as potential solutions to bridge the gap between elites and citizens. Substantial research investigates the functioning of these alternative models of democracy, but surprisingly little attention is paid to politicians’ perspectives and preferences for these reforms. This article fills this gap through an analysis of parliamentarians’ support for referendums and deliberative debates. It uses individual level data from the PartiRep Comparative MP Survey in fourteen European countries to identify individual-level determinants of legislators’ support. The findings reveal distinct explanatory factors of support for deliberative and direct reforms, which have important implications for democratic reform since elected representatives’ preferences strongly influence the type of innovation adopted.

Collective vigilantism, group violence to punish perceived offenses to a community, is both global and common in the contemporary world. It is also crucial for understanding state formation, contestation, crime, law and justice, inequality, and racial and ethnic conflicts. We review existing definitions and explanations for collective vigilantism, present a new typology of collective vigilantism that considers both the aims and level of organization of participating agents, and highlight important patterns that emerge from recent research, including the contributions to this special symposium. We present an argument for what a political science treatment of the topic can offer and introduce an ambitious research agenda that builds on cross-cutting themes and puzzles that emerge from the special symposium.

Mob vigilantism—the punishment of alleged criminals by groups of citizens–is widespread throughout the developing world. Drawing on surveys with more than 13,000 respondents from Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa, this article shows women are more likely than men to support mob vigilantism. Qualitative evidence, a vignette experiment, and survey measures suggest men and women differ in their beliefs about mob vigilantism. Men are more convinced that mob vigilantism creates risks of false accusation for those who do not commit crime. I trace this divergence in beliefs to differences in men’s and women’s personal risk of being accused of a crime that they did not commit. The results speak against the notion that women are inherently more opposed to violence than men.

Existing scholarship on vigilantism focuses on explaining factors that push citizens into the streets to take the law into their own hands. This article complements these theories by examining fear of reprisals that can keep vigilantes off the streets. It argues that vigilantism becomes rife when vigilantes find a systematic way to collude with state officials to obtain impunity. Qualitative data from Indonesia illustrate how street-level policemen grant selective impunity for vigilantism to gain public support for dispensing their more pressing duties. Contrary to conventional wisdom that links state-building to a decline in vigilantism, analysis of a sub-national dataset of 33,262 victims of vigilantism in Indonesia shows that a rapid expansion of the state’s coercive presence is associated with higher levels of vigilante violence.

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.

What explains variation in the structure and practices of collective vigilantism? I develop a framework that focuses on relations among victims and between victims and the state. I use the framework to compare variation in collective vigilantism enacted by avocado and berry sectors in Michoacán, Mexico. Centralized collective vigilantism by the avocado sector entailed a single sectoral organization coordinating victims’ extra-legal activities with no interference from local politicians. By contrast, decentralized collective vigilantism by the berry sector consisted of multiple autonomous groups of victims in conflict with criminals, local political authorities and among each other as they competed for power and resources. These differences in collective vigilantism can be traced back to differences in the local political economies that shape relations among victims and between them and the state.

Today’s Black Lives Matter movement has drawn attention to racial violence, especially lethal police violence, and compared it to the “Jim Crow” U.S. South. However, this comparison requires more specific information about racial violence during this period. Uncovering and organizing this information are the main objectives of the Burnham-Nobles Digital Archive. It documents racial killings in the American South, 1930–1954. Racial killings refer to killings where racial animus, or perceived infraction of Jim Crow norms, are documented or reasonably inferred from newspaper reports or U.S. government and civil rights organization documents. This research note discusses how the Archive contributes to basic comparative politics topics of democratic governance and subnational authoritarianism and methodological concerns, including the creation of databases used in the comparative study of collective vigilantism.

From 1982 to 1983, General Efraín Ríos Montt presided over an especially bloody period of the
Guatemalan civil war. Under Ríos Montt’s watch, the state killed approximately 75,000 of its
own citizens. Yet less than a decade later, the former dictator emerged as one of the most popular
politicians in newly democratic Guatemala. How did a gross human rights violator stage such an
improbable comeback? Using process tracing, I argue that Ríos Montt’s trajectory is best
explained by his embrace of populism as his core political strategy. This analysis deepens our
knowledge of an important case, while shedding light on broader questions about how and when
actors with profoundly undemocratic values can hijack democracy for their own ends.

Social protests are a feature of democracy in Latin America. When the police cannot handle them, governments, facing threats to their tenure, are tempted to order the armed forces to step in. The military, when ordered to deploy in counter-protest operations, exhibits behaviors ranging from defiance to conditional and full compliance. The article investigates the sources of variation in military responses to mass protests, leveraging a small-n comparative analysis and a diverse case selection strategy. It draws on qualitative evidence from Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador, democracies with a history of protests. It finds that a combination of the judicial risks soldiers assume if they repress, professional mission preferences, and social identity between the military and the protesters are the most compelling explanations for military responses.

Are long-standing, widespread grievances a necessary condition for civil resistance campaigns? We argue historical framing can enable sudden mass uprisings even where long-standing anti-regime grievances are absent. Protest cascades can develop to challenge relatively stable, popular governments through four interdependent historical framing mechanisms. First, protesters and bystanders may draw analogies to historical contentious episodes. Second, individuals or groups may imagine themselves occupying paradigmatic roles from past popular struggles, offering prescriptions for action. Third, protesters can adopt symbolic and tactical repertoires from previous contentious episodes. Finally, protesters may concentrate protests within symbolic space. We develop our theory with evidence from Nicaragua’s 2018 mass uprising, which nearly toppled previously-popular President Daniel Ortega, after violence against protesters activated powerful frames resonating with Nicaragua’s history of dictatorship and revolution.

Recent research claims that the link between partisanship and policy is weak and that left-wing governments tax the poor surprisingly heavily. In this article, I argue that left-wing taxation depends on the institutional context, not constraints from unions or overall spending. Using novel data, I demonstrate that the left tax more regressively in countries using proportional electoral systems, and more progressively in majoritarian countries. The political mechanism is evaluated in a comparison of Swedish and British tax policy after WWII. Uncertainty over future influence made the left in Britain wary of consumption tax, while the left in Sweden combined consumption tax with expanded social programs. Political risk shaped the strategies of key actors and helps explain the divergence in tax policy during this period.

Inequality is unequally distributed across the territory, and national averages obscure this variation. Pockets of very high inequality persist at the subnational level of government, even when national governments implement large scale redistributive policies. This study investigates which factors at the subnational level may help explaining differences in income inequality across units. The main claim is that in subnational units where local economic elites capture provincial states by occupying relevant positions in their governments have lower taxes on land, spend less in social programs, have more repression of federal labor rights, and, as a consequence, have higher inequality. The study uses a large-N analysis of original panel data for Argentina, presents a comparative study of two cases, and explores some comparative implications in the conclusions.

This article theorizes and uses global and longitudinal data on gender quota laws to investigate how levels and dimensions of democracy affect the adoption of different quota types. Our results demonstrate that countries at middle levels of the democracy scale are more likely to adopt quotas. Within this diverse group of countries, those that have relatively low levels of electoral contestation (i.e., limited political rights) are most likely to adopt reserved seats. On the other hand, the likelihood of adopting candidate quotas is highest in countries where the protection of civil liberties (i.e., individual freedoms of association, etc.) is moderately high. Our findings suggest that different levels and dimensions of democracy provide political actors with incentives and constraints that create distinct trajectories for quota adoption.

Why do infrastructure projects that are similar in nature develop along starkly different trajectories? This question sheds light on the varying state capacity of developing countries. Divergent from structural explanations that stress external agency and institutional explanations that emphasize bureaucratic capacity, I propose a political championship theory to explain the variance in states capacity of infrastructure delivery. I argue that when a project is highly salient to leaders’ survival, leaders commit to the project; leaders with strong authority build an implementation coalition, leading to higher effectiveness. I trace the process of the Standard Gauge Railway in Kenya and Addis-Djibouti Railway in Ethiopia, relying on over 180 interviews. This research highlights the individual agency within structural and institutional constraints, a previously understudied area in state capacity.

Under what conditions will authoritarian courts issue decisions that constrain state actors? This study breaks new ground in authoritarianism research by explaining when authoritarian states are—and are not—held accountable to legal norms. I leverage evidence from interviews with Jordanian and Palestinian legal actors, original data on judicial decisions, and two years of fieldwork shadowing judges as they conducted business in the courthouse. I find that courts in Jordan and Palestine are hardly regime pawns, as judges routinely prioritize their own interests above those of regime elites. My results also demonstrate that lawsuits revealing instances of intra-state disunity are particularly good vehicles for expanding judicial authority over state activity and, further, that appellate courts are uniquely less capable of constraining state actors.

Governments throughout the world invoke human rights ideas to motivate policy reforms. What impact do rights-based frames have on the policy process? I argue that rights-based frames can generate new resources and institutional opportunities that restructure battles over public policy. These resources and opportunities can both initially legitimate state interventions that violate rights, while also creating openings to hold governments accountable for abuses committed by the state in the name of human rights. I develop this argument by analyzing a militarized security intervention in Bogotá, Colombia, which the local government framed as necessary to stop the commercial sexual exploitation of children—yet yielded new rights violations. This article reveals the material consequences of human rights discourses in battles over policing and urban planning.

To complain to and about government is an essential political act, with consequences for citizen-state relations. This article examines these dynamics in the policing sector, through a study of grievance redressal hearings in the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. The hearings provide a critical channel to justice for some of the most marginalized, including women. However, most participants become less satisfied following their hearings, as initial hopes are dashed against the constraints of local policing. The study highlights the promise and limits of formal complaints mechanisms, which can amplify citizens’ voices but—when coupled with an expectations gap—can also deepen grievances. Complaining, I argue, is a powerful but at times paradoxical form of voice, conditioned by citizens’ expectations and by state capacity.

Scholars of autocracies increasingly debate whether autocratic regimes promote their subordinates based on achievements, such as economic performance, and further a meritocratic system. This article argues that the extent to which autocratic regimes reward economic performance is not constant over the course of an autocratic regime’s lifespan but varies depending on the strategic goals of the regime and the regime’s ability to monitor its subordinates’ performance. We collect a new dataset on the careers of the regional leaders of the German Nazi Party, the Gauleiters, from 1936 to 1944, and a wealth of historical data sources from the regime. Using this, we show that better regional economic performance increased the chance of receiving a promotion before the outbreak of World War II but not after.

Why were most ethnic minority organizations in interwar Poland permitted and sometimes encouraged by the state, when the ruling titular ethnic group pursued discriminatory policies against the same minority groups, faced hostility from these groups, and had the capacity to repress their organizations? Current literature focuses on repression as the main strategy deployed by states to manage these relationships. This article, on the other hand, asks why states allow minority organizations to operate. Using the logic of divide and rule, this article demonstrates that, in the case of multi-ethnic states, a state may prefer a plurality of organizations representing a certain minority ethnic group, particularly if the group is restive, in order to ensure that a united opposition cannot legitimately threaten the state’s political survival.

Why are large-scale participatory institutions implemented in some countries but only adopted on paper in others? I argue that nationwide implementation of Binding Participatory Institutions (BPIs)––a critical subtype of participatory institutions––is dependent on the backing of a strong institutional supporter, often a political party. In turn, parties will only implement BPIs if they place a lower value on the political costs than on the potential benefits of implementation. This will be true if: 1) significant societal demand exists for BPI implementation and 2) the party’s political opponents cannot take advantage of BPIs for their own gain. I test this theory through two detailed case studies of Venezuela and Ecuador, drawing on 165 interviews with key national-level actors and grassroots activists.

The regulator’s existence under authoritarianism is a precarious one. They must carefully address the regime’s desire for safer food, stable financial markets, and cleaner air without antagonizing politically favored firms or generating social unrest. At the same time, they face reputational pressures from their international counterparts to implement global best practices at home. This article highlights how enterprising officials have quietly sought to expand their authority in the context of an authoritarian regulatory state. By focusing on aviation, financial services, food safety, and environmental protection in China, I highlight how agencies, responding to domestic bureaucratic competition and embeddedness in global networks, have led to the emergence of four distinct types of regulatory authority: regulatory command, subversion, coordination, and ensnarement.

Most non-democratic regimes engineer elections such that regime change is effectively impossible via the ballot. However, many of these elections see high turnover of politicians at the subnational level, often through competitive processes that occur within ruling parties. This is the case for President Yoweri Museveni’s dominant National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda, the ranks of which have been decimated by intra-party competition at each election throughout its three decades in power. This competition includes high levels of voter participation in mass primaries and general elections and is particularly acute in the rural southern areas where Museveni’s simultaneous presidential candidacy draws most support. Based on qualitative data from the 2016 elections, this article investigates the relationship between this local, intra-party competition and Museveni’s survival, building a theory that local competition in electoral authoritarian regimes can provide an outlet for accountability politics by redirecting widespread voter frustrations away from a regime and towards expendable local politicians.

I characterize modern social scientific studies of the state as comprising three generations: society-centered, state-centered, and the state-in-society approach. I then discuss how recent books by James Scott, David Stasavage, and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson advance the literature by taking the entire history of human political development into account. Lastly, I build on recent contributions in the field to propose what I call a “State-in-Society 2.0” framework, in which state-society linkages through elite social networks shape the strength and form of the state. The framework provides a potentially promising analytical perspective that sheds new light on the “meso-temporal” dynamics that link broad historical trends in state-society relations with state development outcomes in a variety of cases.

Under what conditions are governments able to liberalize labor markets? I leverage the cases of Portugal and Spain, two countries hit by the Eurozone crisis and constrained in their policy options, that diverge in the key measure mandated by international creditors to recover—the decentralization of collective bargaining. Against the common assumption that the liberalization of labor is widely embraced by capital, I show that governments are only able to advance labor reforms when there is a leading industrial export sector that benefits from it and provides a powerful domestic social partner. I test this argument with in-depth qualitative data collected during twelve months of fieldwork in both countries, including 129 interviews with politicians, policy-makers, and members of business associations and labor confederations, among others.

This article investigates the politics of holding bank executives accountable for banking crises. The post-2008 financial crisis was characterized by a significant variation in the endorsement of retributive justice. While some countries established special prosecutorial bodies and facilitated prosecutions, others relied on the existing prosecutorial mechanisms to seek out wrongdoing. The comparative experience of Iceland and Cyprus shows that the unfolding of the crisis shapes the appetite of politicians for retributive justice. With a banking collapse, politicians will be most proactive, as voters’ demand for justice is high and the risks for the banking industry are minimal. With a severe yet negotiated crisis following a bailout/bail-in, politicians are more reluctant to endorse policies that may risk the recovery of the fragile banking sector.

States of emergency grant chief executives the power to bypass democratic constraints in order to combat existential threats. As such, they are ideal tools to erode democratic institutions while maintaining the illusion of constitutional legitimacy. Therefore, states of emergency should be associated with a heightened risk of autocratization––a decline in a regime’s democratic attributes. Despite this theoretical link and the contemporary relevance of both autocratization and states of emergency, no prior study has empirically tested this relationship. This article tests this relationship using data on sixty democracies for 1974 to 2016. We find that democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency. This evidence strongly suggests that states of emergency circumvent democratic processes in ways that might promote democratic decline.

Studies of a small number of countries have revealed that both democratic and non-democratic subnational governments can exist within a single country. However, these works have neither demonstrated how common subnational regime variation is nor explained why some countries are more prone to it. This article does both. We show that subnational regime variation exists in all world regions, in both unitary and federal states, and in both the present and past, using Varieties of Democracy global data from 1900 to 2018. The article also demonstrates theoretically and empirically how social heterogeneity and factors undermining a national government’s ability to extend control throughout a country promote this variation. Specifically, subnational regime variation is more common in countries that are ethnically diverse, rugged, and populous.

When facing state-backed repression, why do groups sometimes band together in solidarity and sometimes fail to do so? This study contributes to the literature on repression by studying how and why repressed groups react to repression, focusing on how registered civil society groups affect solidarity. Specifically, I trace the impact of the Chinese Communist Party’s Cross Demolition Campaign on patterns of solidarity and victim blaming among Christian Churches. I further demonstrate conditions under which repressed group members become more fragmented and scattered rather than more unified. Based on evidence from sixty-four elite and mass interviews, I find that registered groups’ legibility constrains their members, thus enabling dynamics of victim-blaming that hinder solidarity and further empowering the autocrat to divide and conquer potential opposition.

This article presents a comparative ethnography of the smallholder agroforestry projects of an international environmental organization. Migrant ranchers in Brazil sell cattle from private properties in a heavily-deforested landscape. Indigenous farmers in Indonesia rely on subsistence food production on customary lands in a heavily-forested landscape. Despite these differences, the projects identify both migrant ranchers and indigenous farmers as “smallholders” and prescribe cash crop agroforestry as the solution to both their predicaments. In the face of expanding ranches and plantations, this cash crop solution accepts the destruction of forest ecosystems and livelihoods as inevitable, funneling smallholders into market agroforestry in agro-industrial landscapes. This article strengthens the case for comparative ethnography and challenges discursive conflations and political-economic biases of prevailing sustainable development policies.

How does ethnicity influence mass support for radical reforms? Treating ethnicity as a set of cognitively useful categories serving both ethnocentric and inclusive ends, we argue people can strive toward civic visions for their state yet interpret obstacles through “ethnic” lenses. We label this phenomenon aspirational identity politics, prominent when external aggressors exploit identity commonalities with home-state subpopulations. Consequently, ethnic cognition can facilitate radical reform support not only through ethnocentrism, but also by connecting prosocial dispositions to support for in-group favoring reforms. Accordingly, original survey data from Ukraine in 2017 reveal prosocial values better predict support for nine radical reforms––including in-group favoring ones––than does ethnocentrism. Support is also strongest among economically better-off people, indicating backing for radical reform is generally more about aspiration than desperation.

The three books reviewed here represent a new generation of rigorous scholarship on participatory institutions (PIs). They demonstrate that––under certain conditions––it is possible to build large-scale PIs that strengthen democratic governance and improve citizens’ lives. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain. Due in part to the absence of either high-quality national-level comparative data or fine-grained subnational data, and in part to research design choices of existing studies, the literature remains limited in its capacity to make general claims about the causes and effects of large-scale PIs. Ultimately, the key question collectively addressed, but not fully answered, by the works reviewed is whether governments can build PIs that deliver on their promise to improve the quality of democracy and enhance public service provision on a large scale in diverse contexts beyond Brazil.