How do government-led social safety net programs in areas of violence, conflict, and state fragility shape trust in governments? Drawing on 394 qualitative interviews across twenty villages in Burkina Faso and Cameroon, we found that knowledge of governments’ roles in aid delivery programs can be a double-edged sword. While government attribution seems to improve attitudes towards governments in program sites, it widens the gap between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries’ confidence in state institutions. Indeed, non-beneficiaries with the highest levels of information and government attribution were likely to feel more neglected by the state than those with no information. We refer to this dynamic as an information paradox, wherein information about the government’s role boosts trust in the state for some and undermines it for others.

Constitution-making is cast as a state-society dialogue, with public consultation sustaining the legal fiction that “the people” write the social contract. I introduce will-confirmation—the interpretive practice whereby elites utilize underdetermined public input to legitimate representative claims. It has two modes: constructive (synthesizing ambiguous input into alignment) and dismissive (excluding contrary input as unrepresentative). Across thirty-seven interviews from Chile’s Constitutional Convention and Cuba’s Drafting Commission, I show how will-confirmation operates amid crises of representation. In Chile, drafters claiming to embody the people produced parallel monologues, aggravating rather than resolving a lack of elite consensus. In Cuba, drafters and regime-loyal intermediaries filtered input into centralized coherence, obscuring rather than remedying the absence of ideological pluralism. Will-confirmation reduced consultation to self-legitimation rather than a check on interpretation.

This article explains when and why high courts in new democracies engage in post-decision monitoring to secure compliance with their rulings. We develop a theory of strategic monitoring in which judges, lacking enforcement capacity, selectively deploy oversight mechanisms in response to reputational risks generated by social pressure. Leveraging an original dataset of 6,093 decisions from Ecuador’s Constitutional Court (2015–2024), we show that the presence and intensity of amicus curiae participation significantly increase the likelihood of monitoring, while budgetary resources and political salience do not. These findings indicate that courts engage in institutional triage, prioritizing cases where non-compliance is most likely to generate public scrutiny. The article advances a large-N perspective on post-decision enforcement highlighting the pivotal role of civil-society participation in strengthening judicial compliance.

How is between-group inequality related to collective action in broker-mediated patronage systems? Research typically examines between-group inequality at coarse scales, like countries, but I argue that hyper-local neighborhood context conditions politically relevant outcomes. Using original household survey data from over 200 Indian informal settlements, with social network data from a subset, I show local inequality between caste (jati) groups is associated with lower neighborhood collective action potential. Probing mechanisms, I show neighborhoods with higher between-group inequality exhibit more inter-caste conflict and weaker reciprocity; problem-solving networks are also more fragmented, and brokers struggle to build large, cross-caste followings, with adverse consequences for mobilization. These findings contribute to debates on how diversity and inequality structure political behavior and underscore the importance of micro-contexts where citizens interact and mobilize.

Why do authoritarian regimes tolerate minor opposition parties with little chance of winning power? This article argues that such parties persist because regimes deliberately structure political competition. Minor opposition parties enhance regime stability through two mechanisms. First, they boost electoral legitimacy by broadening political choice and sustaining the appearance of competition without threatening control. Second, they reduce electoral uncertainty by fragmenting opposition support, imitating major challengers, and occupying ideological niches. Focusing on Russia after the 2012 party registration reform, which sharply increased the number of parties, the analysis draws on an original dataset of 367 regional legislative elections (2003–2024). It shows that minor parties are more prevalent in politically vulnerable regions, increase turnout, weaken stronger opposition forces, and reinforce authoritarian resilience.

Why do revolutions produce sometimes strong yet unstable states after revolutionary victory? To answer this question, I utilize an original dataset and archival evidence to examine patterns of subnational-level state building in Communist China after 1949. I find that prior revolutionary experiences improved social compliance of state policies, but weakened the building of state institutions and incited public disorder. The key mechanism lies in the entrenchment of social antagonism developed during intense revolutionary struggle, which catalyzed public support for state-led social reform but also planted suspicion of perceived counterrevolutionary forces in both state and society. These findings challenge the notion that revolutions naturally create strong states and contribute to our broader understanding of how social mobilization affects state building processes.

Research on social movements has illuminated when and how they influence policy formulation, but less is known about what shapes the durability of those policies once adopted. Why do some victories endure while others erode? Drawing on the process-tracing of seventeen movements around mining conflicts in Ecuador and Peru during the 2000s commodity boom, we argue that post-adoption politics are critical. Policy durability requires movements to sustain pressure both from civil society and the state. Beyond sustained mobilization power, durable full gains hinge on two strategic objectives: leveraging a decision point in regulatory agencies and securing a favorable ruling from a higher-level authority such as the presidency or high courts. Movements achieving only the former attain temporary partial gains; lacking both leads to defeat.

Political corruption is a leading governance challenge, yet governments often lack the will to tackle it and may use anti-corruption to undermine democracy. This dilemma has given rise to international anti-corruption commissions (IACCs), which rely on partnerships between international experts and domestic personnel. Why are some IACCs granted independence, while others are politically subordinate? Focusing on northern Central America, this article argues that where coalitions comprised of government insiders and domestic activists maintain a seat at the negotiating table, they use their agenda-setting capacities, expertise, and ability to raise the audience costs of incumbent maneuvers to dilute anti-corruption to ensure greater IACC independence. Additionally, struggles over IACC autonomy are influenced by transnational dynamics, as political leaders learn from one another how to limit anti-corruption enforcement.

Why can support for cash transfers decrease among beneficiaries when poverty is growing? This article argues that support for redistributive policies is dynamic and shaped by citizens’ evaluations of policy results. When beneficiaries feel cash transfers help them cope with hardship, support can increase. However, if recipients perceive these policies as insufficient in offsetting their economic situation, they may view them as ineffective in consistently alleviating poverty. Consequently, recipients may oppose expanding cash transfers while continuing to support deeper redistributive policies—such as education and job-training programs—that offer long-term economic improvement. Using a multi-method design that combines weighted difference-in-differences estimations, machine learning models, focus groups, and a novel face-to-face survey in Argentina, the findings show how preferences for redistribution can change in different contexts.

Amid rising illiberal anti-LGBTQI backlash, some opposition politicians fear that resisting it is a political trap that could jeopardize their electoral fortunes. We evaluate this concern in Hungary, where Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government passed a law banning Pride marches. The leading opposition figure, Péter Magyar of Tisza, initially avoided opposing the law, ostensibly to protect his party’s future electoral prospects. In a May 2025 survey experiment, we find that this “avoidance” strategy reduces Magyar’s approval while failing to increase support for his party. Theoretically, we conceptualize a value-credibility cost mechanism through which elite silence diminishes moral authority, cedes issue ownership, and weakens support for LGBTQI rights. Our results, buttressed by interviews with LGBTQI organizers, contribute to a literature on the costs and benefits of minority rights inclusion in electoral strategy.

The colonial origins of development paradigm have generated important explanations for unequal development in the Global South. Through a review of four recently published books, I critique the colonial origins framework to highlight its limitations. I first critique the colonial origins paradigm for its empirical focus on variation among formerly colonized countries, which obscures the large-scale and enduring inequalities between states in the Global South and the Global North. Secondly, I critique the colonial logic of “development,” which centers the epistemic and material dominance of the Global North and marginalizes the ways of knowing and social organization of indigenous and internally colonized subjects. I conclude by discussing the implications of these critiques for how we understand global inequality and alternative solutions articulated from the Global South.

Autocracies have increasingly begun to clothe themselves in the guise of hybrid, semi-official institutions that exhibit a degree of autonomy from the state, such as Government-Organized NGOs (GONGOs), “zombie” election observers, regime-run think tanks, astroturfing, or semi-official state-mobilized movements (SMMs). Existing literature has analyzed hybrid institutions as products of their functions. Instead, by employing a historical-institutional analysis of the evolution of Jordanian youth GONGOs, I demonstrate that institutional hybridity often arises from institutional contradictions, particularly between the path dependence (vested interests, inertia, and inflexibility) of existing institutions and shifting regime objectives, which drive autocrats to establish parallel hybrid institutions to perform the job existing institutions cannot. These findings bridge scholarship on historical institutionalism and authoritarian institutions by emphasizing the centrality of contradictions in institutional change.

Despite the predominance of informality in Russian state-business relations (SBRs), regional administrations have established diverse institutionalized forms of cooperation with business actors. These include socio-economic development agreements, public-private partnerships, and consultation mechanisms. Utilizing fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), this study systematically examines SBRs across all of Russia’s federal subjects, identifying varying degrees of institutionalization. The findings reveal that strongly institutionalized SBRs, found in fifty-nine out of eighty-three regions, result from four distinct configurations: a monopolistic economy, hegemonic authoritarian politics, personalist politics, and competitive authoritarian politics. The analysis demonstrates that institutionalized SBRs are beneficial for both business and state actors. It offers valuable insights into the rationale behind the formation of formal cooperation between state and businesses, thereby addressing key questions in comparative research on authoritarianism.

Labor unrest has become a salient feature of contentious politics around the globe. Yet, scholars disagree over the determinants of labor’s rise against the ruling elite in non-democracies. This article argues that emotional contagion explains a short-term spike in labor mobilization. Drawing on empirical evidence from Belarus, one of the most repressive political regimes in contemporary Europe, the study provides support for the argument. Utilizing original data from in-depth interviews with labor activists and industrial workers, empirical analysis demonstrates that a shared sense of outrage over the scale of police violence, along with the magnitude of electoral malpractices and the government’s neglect of citizens’ needs during a public health crisis, was a major catalyst for labor mobilization in the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election.

Studies have discussed long-term effects of state-led violence on victims’ political attitudes and behaviors, but less is known about its impacts on those who sided with the perpetrators. We develop a theory of authoritarian indoctrination and cognitive dissonance that explains variation in outgroup intolerance among the majority group, focusing on the ethnic violence against Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese minority. Drawing upon unique survey data, we find that proximity to anti-Chinese violence in 1996–1999 correlates with elevated outgroup animosity today, particularly among individuals who grew up during the autocratic era. We further demonstrate that such bias extends to political behavior, leading to support for right-wing politicians instigating outgroup prejudice. Findings highlight historical legacies of authoritarian-led ethnic violence as a source of political intolerance.

For a long time, qualitative scholars found it hard not to talk about KKV. Designing Social Inquiry and its authors Gary (K)ing, Robert (K)eohane, and Sidney (V)erba galvanized an earlier generation of qualitative methodologists to write a number of important rejoinders contesting the meanings of terms and defending the very use of these methods. The authors of Doing Good Qualitative Research, Qualitative Literacy, and Integrated Inferences represent a new generation, one that has eschewed the shopworn debates of the past and is interested solely in developing and improving qualitative methods. These books constitute part of a larger and ongoing qualitative metamorphosis: the emergence of a new qualitative methodology that is more confident, inclusive, and one that is no longer willing to play by quantitative rules.

Prior research suggests that punitive transitional justice (TJ) may foster a sense of collective exoneration among perpetrator groups, potentially reducing support for remembrance of in-group atrocities in the long term. We test this potential “hidden cost’’ of TJ in Germany using a vignette experiment manipulating perceptions of the extent of denazification and an observational analysis exploiting variation in denazification intensity across occupation zones. We find that while perceptions of comprehensive Nazi accountability foster beliefs that the German in-group was fully held responsible, these perceptions do not affect support for commemoration or responsibility toward victims. These results contribute to the broader literature on TJ’s long-term attitudinal impacts and the determinants of support for historical remembrance, emphasizing the enduring importance of moral over legal perceptions of accountability.

Right-wing populism, notably Trumpism, has presented a formidable challenge to democracy. We explore the historical roots of Trumpism among the Chinese diaspora by analyzing nearly one million tweets from approximately 200 Chinese overseas opinion leaders between 2019 and early 2021. We develop a novel measure of authoritarian imprints, drawing on the usage of high-frequency words from the political discourse of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). Leveraging computational text analysis, we identify both pro-Trump and anti-democratic stances in these tweets. Our analysis reveals that Chinese opinion leaders with strong authoritarian imprints are significantly more likely to support Trump and endorse anti-democratic actions, such as rejecting the 2020 presidential election result and advocating for unconstitutional means to overturn the result.

Under what conditions can repression, generally assumed to induce obedience through violence, consolidate authoritarian power in a non-violent way? I propose a novel theory of the effects of repression, accounting for regional heterogeneity of state capacity. Failed centralization efforts during state-building processes lead to the emergence of strong local power structures, fostering persistent resistance against autocratic cooptation strategies. Repression in such “restive” regions has downstream effects that complement autocrats’ cooptation policies by increasing the state’s extractive and informational capacities. To test these predictions, I leverage a legal change resulted in the replacement of pro-Kurdish mayors with government-appointed trustees in Turkey’s restive regions. Adopting two-way-fixed-effects models, I demonstrate evidence supporting my theory. This article provides an alternative view about how repression generates favorable outcomes for autocrats.

The global emergence of authoritarian capitalism warrants analysis of its features, economic pathways, and class basis. We argue that the timing of capitalism’s establishment relative to authoritarianism affects the extent of state capture by business and the regime’s stance towards labor. When capitalism preceded authoritarianism, autocracy arose from a “crisis of capitalism” in flawed democracies, either from fear of communist redistribution or backlash against neoliberalism in post-communist countries. These governments appealed to business and labor interests for electoral survival. Conversely, when authoritarianism preceded capitalism, late industrializing states with weak business and working classes pursued developmental agendas by exercising autonomy over capital and repressing labor. Understanding these historical pathways to authoritarian capitalism provides insight on contemporary democratic backsliding and right-wing populism in the U.S. and Europe.

How are we to interpret the rising popularity of right-wing populist and outright authoritarian parties in European democracies? Commonly, elections are seen as handing a mandate to their winners. So, are such forces increasingly receiving a mandate from voters to carry out their policies? This article reviews three recent books (Authoritarianism and the Evolution of West European Electoral Politics by Erik R. Tillman, Democracy Erodes from the Top by Larry M. Bartels, and Voters under Pressure by Ruth Dassonneville) and argues that the mandate interpretation strikes out. These books illustrate how politicians shape “mandates,” how “mandates” can be ignored by those in power, and how the party system and the electorate are not structured (anymore) in a way to allow for genuine mandates to emerge.

Countries transitioning from civil war and authoritarian legacies often adopt transitional justice measures like reparations, prosecutions, and truth commissions. The success of these efforts depends, in part, on interactions with victims. We propose a framework linking victims’ engagement with reparations programs to political participation. We then use panel survey data from over 12,000 respondents in conflict-affected regions of Colombia to show that those who engage with transitional justice institutions are more likely to contact local leaders or politicians and join grassroots organizations. Mediation analysis reveals that while victimization drives much of this engagement, interactions with reparations programs independently increase contacting leaders and voting. Our findings have important implications for transitional justice, peacebuilding, and democratic participation.

Why do some victorious rebels invest in statebuilding and public goods, while others prioritize private enrichment? I theorize that post-victory governance is rooted in rebels’ pre-victory ideologies, distinguishing between rebels’ ideologies on two dimensions: how much they aim to transform society (programmatic or opportunistic) and the proportion of the population they wish to benefit (inclusive or exclusive). Programmatic transformation and delivering inclusive benefits require building infrastructural power and expanding state reach, while opportunistic use of power for exclusive, private gains does not necessitate non-coercive power. Fieldwork-based case studies of three victorious rebel organizations—the more programmatic-inclusive FSLN in Nicaragua, the more opportunistic-exclusive NPFL in Liberia, and the middle-ground NRM in Uganda—provide support for the theory, and the conclusion addresses implications for scholarship and policy.

Security is the canonical public good provided by the state to its citizens. Yet, many states are incapable or unwilling to provide security in a consistent fashion across their territory. The provision of security, order, and management of crime is a crucial “good” that parties can and do offer their constituents, resulting in widespread variation in security at the neighborhood level. What explains this variation in the provision of security and local policing by political parties? Drawing on 132 semi-structured interviews conducted during eight months of fieldwork in Lebanon, this study suggests that organizational capacity is one determinant of whether political parties step into the role of security providers. It shows that maintaining robust linkages with constituent communities and party members at the local level are necessary to coordinating security measures.

How do crises affect information gathering in authoritarian regimes? This study examines how crises impact appeal systems’ ability to collect information on everyday and crisis-related concerns. We argue that crisis immediacy and government repression shape the number and topic of appeals received. Utilizing a novel dataset of appeals submitted to Russia’s Presidential Administration, we analyze four crises: the 2018 pension reform, the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the subsequent partial military mobilization. High-immediacy crises generate more crisis-related appeals, while repression suppresses everyday appeals on routine governance issues. This study contributes to scholarship on informational autocracies by highlighting the vulnerability of information-gathering institutions. Focusing on citizen behavior rather than regime incentives, we offer insights into how individuals utilize appeals systems under crisis conditions, enriching understanding of state-society dynamics and the limitations of consultative institutions in autocratic contexts.

Recently, the field of revolutionary theory has seen a flourishing of novel scholarly efforts that constitute a genuine regeneration of how we conceive of, investigate, and interpret revolutions. The first elements of this regeneration of revolutionary theory have now found their way to print, and the scene is set for a prospective revolution in our field. This article surveys the history of revolutionary theory since 1883, establishes the scope and contribution of the field’s present rejuvenation, and charts the place of these developments in the field’s broader path, before closing by exploring what may be in store for students of revolution in the future. In doing so, the article draws attention to three areas of current rejuvenation: latent patterns of revolution; long revolutionary outcomes; and revolutionary ideas. Moreover, it proposes three areas for fruitful new research: revolutionary programs, revolutions as political systems, and the dynamics occurring within “the fog of revolution.”