This article proposes that the specific conditions under which collective action happens in informal markets generate a non-linear relation between organizational density (the number of organizations representing a single constituency) and effective claim-making around common objectives, unlike the expectations of standard theories tailored to organizational activity in the formal sector. Informal workers’ capacity to demand resources from the government is best served by intermediate levels of organizational density, when organizations experience enough competition to make them responsive to their constituencies, but not so much that internal strife undermines their effectiveness in securing shared objectives. To test this argument, I leverage a mixed-methods approach to examine the case of informal workers’ organizational behavior in public and street markets in Mexico City.

Under what conditions do dictators enact pro-worker legislation? Conventional wisdom suggests that heightened mass discontent motivates dictators to make policy concessions to defuse revolutionary threats. However, a more protective labor law may decrease elites’ economic benefits—and thus loyalty to the regime. I argue that limited judicial independence helps dictators control the distributional outcomes of the law and therefore better respond to the twin challenges magnified by labor reforms. To test this argument, I conduct a cross-national analysis of sixty-eight autocracies from 1970 to 2008. I then examine an illustrative case—China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law—to illuminate how a non-independent judiciary gives autocrats more leeway to balance the interests of elites and the masses. This article contributes to our understanding of authoritarian survival strategies amid distributive tensions.

Why are perennially entrenched institutions so hard to reform? This article proposes a theory of institutional rebound based on China’s reforms to break the three “iron-institutions” in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). I argue that reforms triggered the rise of informal institutions, which impeded further reforms and made old rules rebound. When SOE cadres had denser political connections, they actively manipulated the rules to maintain privileges. When managers and workers had fewer political resources, they used performative resistance to delay reforms and penalize reform advocates. The pressure to complete reforms drove cadres to first target the powerless, replacing them with cronies, before having to move to the more powerful. The article combines in-depth interviews, secondary sources, and topical modeling of newspaper and journal articles across three decades.

We study the effects of transitional justice (TJ) programs that punish large numbers of human rights violators through the lenses of social psychology theories on how individuals respond to punishment in allocative situations, including how defendants in court trials evaluate their verdicts. We analyze subnational variation in procedures and outcomes of denazification trials in West Germany during 1946–1947. Consistently with established findings in social psychology, we find that procedural justice and the distributive fairness of outcomes can compensate for the anti-democratic attitudinal effects of being a defendant in a TJ trial. We also find evidence that procedural justice influences the democratic attitudes of family members of TJ defendants. The study has implications for contemporary cases of TJ programs that affect large numbers of perpetrators.

What determines the vote in referenda: issue-preferences or second-order considerations? Scholars suggest issue-voting is stronger in salient elections. Based on survey data collected during Chile’s constitutional referendum, the article challenges this argument. An innovative conjoint experiment allows us to estimate if different elements of the constitution sunk the proposal. Coupled with vote choice models, results indicate that second-order considerations played a more important role than the literature predicts. We argue this is because studies mostly study referenda on European integration in parliamentary systems. Unlike European integration, the constitutional proposal was not a cross-cutting “issue,” but one tied to the incumbent. Presidentialism exacerbated government/opposition dynamics, such that the incumbent’s popularity significantly affected vote choice. We discuss why this is similar to what transpired in other Latin American countries and draw lessons for participatory democracy.

This article reviews four recent books providing new perspectives on the sources of authoritarian durability and addressing the issues of intra-elite power-sharing and control of the masses. One of the main lessons derived from this research is that contingent sequences of historical events and rules of conduct mutually accepted by elites can play a greater role in the stability of a ruling coalition than a sheer balance of power prioritized by the rational choice approach. Another important takeaway is that increasingly refraining from repression, authoritarian rulers seek to project the image of their competence and indispensability. Apart from misinformation and censorship, during economic and political crises, leaders of competitive authoritarian regimes may deliver anti-democratic rhetoric and policies catering to genuine demands of the masses.

Territorial debates complicate the politics of the affected regions, as parties decide whether to compete on a territorial dimension alongside other longstanding important issues. Yet, empirical evidence is scarce regarding how much voters politically weigh territorial issues against others. We theorize that in contexts when such issues are salient, they have a greater weight relative to others due to their identity-oriented nature. We present evidence from conjoint experiments from three European regions with active territorial debates: Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. We find that territorial preferences matter more than others for candidate choice, as the reward (punishment) of congruent (incongruent) candidates is greater, and individuals are less willing to trade off on this issue. Our results have comparative implications for political competition in multidimensional spaces.

How do parties respond to media environments slanted against them? This article exploits variation in the level of media activism of Latin American left-wing governments to answer this question. I argue that the composition of governing parties’ bases of support shapes their communication strategy. While parties with unorganized supporters lack societal channels of communication with the electorate and are forced to resort to alternative media structures to disseminate information, parties with organized supporters communicate through affiliated societal organizations and do not depend on mediatized communication. To illustrate this theory, I process trace the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, drawing on seventy original interviews with key decisionmakers. This article contributes to the literature on political parties by highlighting the overlooked communication function they fulfill.

We argue that authoritarian regimes engage in subnational propaganda targeting in pursuit of political survival. Drawing on an original dataset of propaganda collected inside North Korea, we show that the regime tailors messaging to elites and masses differently. We outline a schema of strategies and themes that authoritarian regimes utilize when crafting propaganda, theorize variations in their use, and test these variations empirically, using qualitative analysis, regression, and text analysis. We demonstrate that the North Korean regime targets Pyongyang-based elites with co-optational messages promising economic benefit, while the masses receive mobilizational messages focused on agricultural productivity. North Korean propaganda also legitimates the regime differently based on audience: messages to elites reassure them of their privileged status but messages to the masses remind them of why their sacrifices are necessary.

The world price of oil is in constant flux, but countries respond to this reality in very different ways. Some heavily regulate the degree to which world prices “pass-through” to the price of gasoline at the pump, while others let domestic gasoline prices track world markets. We develop a novel, weekly dataset—to our knowledge the most comprehensive in existence—to explore the political economy of pass-through policies in over 100 countries. We find that autocracies are more likely than democracies to limit pass-through, especially those that are weakly institutionalized, ineffective providers of public services, and neo-patrimonial. Our project sheds light on the domestic policy choices that affect climate change and has significant implications for understanding price regulation more broadly.

Autocrats must redistribute to survive, but redistribution is limited and selective. Who is entitled to redistribution underlying the authoritarian bargain? I argue redistribution is a question of citizenship. Autocrats use citizenship institutions, especially particularistic membership, to strategically limit and extend socio-economic rights to ensure both security and economic development. I apply this framework to China, where control over particularistic membership decentralized in conjunction with development strategies. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, government policies, and a database of local citizenship policies in China, I trace how local citizenship creates closure while economic development incentivizes strategic inclusion. By evaluating how authoritarian citizenship functions, this framework increases our understanding of individual-state relations in autocratic contexts.

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy.

What explains the militarization of public safety? Despite its failures, police militarization remains a popular policy. Existing scholarship has mainly focused on the police adopting military weapons and tactics but has neglected a silent but consequential type: the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Whereas the conventional wisdom points to partisanship and violence as key drivers, I argue that the militarization of police leaders responds to political motives. Based on a novel data set on 5,580 appointments in Mexico and repeated event history analysis, I find evidence of a top-down militarization sequence. Mayors are more likely to appoint military chiefs when upper levels of government and peers embrace a militarized security strategy. I further illustrate how coercive pressures and strategic incentives drive this sequence.

Recent scholarship on resource politics has found that the “resource curse” is largely specific to the Persian Gulf states in which British oil interests ensured the survival of small states. However, this does not present the entire picture of the relationship between oil and sovereignty. I argue that oil was also involved in the process in which the region protected by colonial powers was divided into certain states out of many possible territorial arrangements, creating states that would otherwise not exist. Based on extensive archival research, I show that when nine Gulf sheikhdoms negotiated under Abu Dhabi’s initiative to create a federation, (1) oil production during the colonial period and (2) the protectorate system led Qatar and Bahrain to reject it and achieve sovereignty separately.

Despite the government’s enormous efforts to forestall widespread protests, China still witnessed many cross-provincial protests in the post-1989 era. How did Chinese citizens find the opportunity to stage cross-provincial protests in a political environment highly hostile to coordination beyond the community level? By tackling this puzzle, this study illuminates the Chinese state’s sophisticatedly differentiated strategies for coping with collective protests. Rather than attribute state leaders’ threat perceptions to static dimensions of protest movements, we posit that dynamic dimensions such as the pathway of scale shift often play a more important role. We propose a typology of pathways through which local protests spread across provincial borders—top-down, outside-in, and bottom-up—and elucidate how the interaction between the pathways and the nature of solidarity shaped government perception and strategy. Besides addressing an important puzzle in China and enhancing our understanding of the political environment in high-capacity authoritarian regimes, this study also underscores how an investigation of dynamic dimensions can provide new insights into the government’s calculations and strategies for managing popular protests.

Research on the international dimension of authoritarianism and democratization has focused on patron-client interaction. This article identifies a specific type of international involvement that is characterized by geopolitical competition. In “international competitive involvement,” multiple rival countries intervene simultaneously and oppositely to support opposing sides during a political transition, namely the military and a faction from the civilian actors. Drawing on evidence from Egypt, Sudan, and Myanmar, I develop a theoretical framework for this type of international involvement and argue that it significantly enhances the military’s repressive capacity and hardens its negotiation position. While the military in cases of non-competitive support perceives of bargaining as a potential option, competitive involvement forecloses the bargaining option as repression becomes the most viable course of action for the military.

Does civil resistance work? Research emphasizes the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance over violent resistance in achieving campaign goals, with the seminal study Why Civil Resistance Works (WCRW) by Chenoweth and Stephan being the main point of reference to date. I revisit this pivotal finding in three steps. First, I reproduce WCRW’s results on nonviolent effectiveness. Second, I discuss how cases may have been overlooked due to a streetlight effect. Third, I quantify the results’ sensitivity using simulations. I find that WCRW’s main findings on nonviolent effectiveness are highly sensitive to variable selection, under-coverage bias, bootstrapping, and omitted variable bias. As a routine reference in scholarship and the public discourse, assessing the robustness of WCRW’s findings is relevant to practitioners and researchers.

This article analyzes changing patterns of worker protest and mobilization in France, with particular emphasis on the post-1970s era of neoliberalism. It argues that processes of state-led disembedding of labor have underpinned major changes in the leadership, content, and class bases of worker contestation. Drawing on more than forty original interviews as well as extensive secondary sources, it highlights a long-term shift in the dynamics of labor’s political engagement, in which unions’ role has been increasingly displaced by broad-based, anti-systemic social movements. Protests have called into question the legitimacy of French capitalism and the state, revealing the dysfunctions of political representation with troubling implications for the stability of French democracy and the governability of advanced capitalist economies.

Why are citizens in some communities able to protest to bring attention to their grievances, while not in others? While a long literature has contended that informal civil society institutions facilitate contentious collective action, not all organizations do so, and some might even discourage it. I argue in this article that inclusive institutions—open to everyone in a community—facilitate protests, while non-inclusive institutions uniting some particularistic sub-groups within communities hinder them. The former provide communities with broad social networks fostering communal unity, while the latter erode communal unity through provoking internal conflicts. I provide evidence for this theory in the sub-municipal context of Mexico, using statistical analysis of data from an original survey of sub-municipal community presidents and qualitative fieldwork evidence from Puebla and Tlaxcala.

In this article, I examine the factors that influence the amount and content of news media reporting on violence against women (VAW) in Brazil. VAW was not considered a relevant political problem until very recently when states began to respond to feminist demands by adopting policies to criminalize VAW and providing resources to survivors. I theorize that the process of improving state action on VAW increases news media attention to these stories. I also argue that heightened political attention to VAW increases news media discussion of policies and laws addressing VAW. Employing time series analysis and computer text analysis of an original dataset from Brazil (2004–2019), I find that strong legislation and congressional bill introduction exert significant positive effects on news media reporting of VAW.

How do authoritarian regimes punish ordinary opposition voters? I argue that elected community politicians help make “punishment regimes,” which discourage opposition support, credible. Strengthened by decentralization reforms, community politicians have information and leverage necessary to identify and punish opposition supporters. When the regime wins community elections, these politicians extend the regime’s reach deep into communities. When opposition parties win, their reach is constrained weakening their electoral control. Using mixed-methods evidence from Tanzania, I show regime-loyal community politicians use their distributive and legal-coercive powers to “deliver the vote” leading voters in these communities to fear individual reprisals for opposition support. In contrast, voters fear individual punishment in opposition-run communities significantly less. This study demonstrates the importance of local institutions and elections when understanding regime durability.

This article investigates whether the Chinese public possesses structured political preferences or ideology. We show that ideology in China is organized around a state-market economic dimension and an authoritarian-democratic political dimension. The most politically informed individuals are the least likely to constrain their ideological preferences to one dimension, which we argue is a product of the Party’s propaganda efforts. We find that younger and better- educated individuals are the most likely to favor free markets and that while members of the Communist Party no longer possess any sort of distinct economic preferences, they are markedly more authoritarian. We conclude that the diffuse character of the Chinese public’s preferences provides the Party with an opportunity to divide and rule.

How do parties historically dominated by one group diversify their representatives? I argue that ethnic parties adjust their strategies according to the institutional rules in place and the demographics of relevant constituencies. I study South Africa, which has a Mixed-Member Proportional electoral system, where parties nominate Single Member District and Proportional Representation candidates. Using original data on the racial, ethnic, and career background of over 10,000 local candidates nominated by the historically white Democratic Alliance party, I find that the party engages in vote-based inclusion by nominating black candidates to predominantly black districts. And while the DA symbolically includes non-whites on its PR lists, white candidates dominate electable list positions. These findings provide a demonstration at the micro-level of why ethnic parties struggle to meaningfully diversify.

The massification of secondary schooling constitutes the key educational project of the first post-war period. However, the resulting educational structures differed in terms of streaming and standardization. Despite their historical opposition to such expansion, center-right parties contributed to shaping these reforms. They generally opposed standardization because their distributive strategy rested on support from elites and middle classes. However, their stance on streaming varied. Centre-right parties supported streaming when they were linked to teachers and private providers who opposed comprehensive reforms, but supported de-streaming where such groups aligned with the left. This article shows how center-right parties in Bavaria, France, and Italy, with common partisan distributive aims, introduced varied public service reforms following from their links to different vested producers. It argues that theorizing such reforms requires considering both distributive and productive environments.

The increasing critique of representative democracy and its institutions determined reformers to consider the direct and deliberative processes as potential solutions to bridge the gap between elites and citizens. Substantial research investigates the functioning of these alternative models of democracy, but surprisingly little attention is paid to politicians’ perspectives and preferences for these reforms. This article fills this gap through an analysis of parliamentarians’ support for referendums and deliberative debates. It uses individual level data from the PartiRep Comparative MP Survey in fourteen European countries to identify individual-level determinants of legislators’ support. The findings reveal distinct explanatory factors of support for deliberative and direct reforms, which have important implications for democratic reform since elected representatives’ preferences strongly influence the type of innovation adopted.

Collective vigilantism, group violence to punish perceived offenses to a community, is both global and common in the contemporary world. It is also crucial for understanding state formation, contestation, crime, law and justice, inequality, and racial and ethnic conflicts. We review existing definitions and explanations for collective vigilantism, present a new typology of collective vigilantism that considers both the aims and level of organization of participating agents, and highlight important patterns that emerge from recent research, including the contributions to this special symposium. We present an argument for what a political science treatment of the topic can offer and introduce an ambitious research agenda that builds on cross-cutting themes and puzzles that emerge from the special symposium.

Mob vigilantism—the punishment of alleged criminals by groups of citizens–is widespread throughout the developing world. Drawing on surveys with more than 13,000 respondents from Uganda, Tanzania, and South Africa, this article shows women are more likely than men to support mob vigilantism. Qualitative evidence, a vignette experiment, and survey measures suggest men and women differ in their beliefs about mob vigilantism. Men are more convinced that mob vigilantism creates risks of false accusation for those who do not commit crime. I trace this divergence in beliefs to differences in men’s and women’s personal risk of being accused of a crime that they did not commit. The results speak against the notion that women are inherently more opposed to violence than men.

Existing scholarship on vigilantism focuses on explaining factors that push citizens into the streets to take the law into their own hands. This article complements these theories by examining fear of reprisals that can keep vigilantes off the streets. It argues that vigilantism becomes rife when vigilantes find a systematic way to collude with state officials to obtain impunity. Qualitative data from Indonesia illustrate how street-level policemen grant selective impunity for vigilantism to gain public support for dispensing their more pressing duties. Contrary to conventional wisdom that links state-building to a decline in vigilantism, analysis of a sub-national dataset of 33,262 victims of vigilantism in Indonesia shows that a rapid expansion of the state’s coercive presence is associated with higher levels of vigilante violence.

Lynching is a surprisingly prevalent form of collective violence. We argue that two conditions can cause lynching: a shared morality based on salient collective threats, providing justification, and weak authority, creating opportunity. We examine this argument with the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In Aceh, the province most impacted, the tsunami was a shock to morality (producing a religious revival) and authority (creating a situation of institutional flux). Using World Bank data, we find that Aceh saw an increase of lynchings, while lynchings stayed on average the same in other parts of Indonesia. Within Aceh, the increase was most pronounced where authority was most undermined and where locals had high levels of shared morality. These findings have implications for research on collective violence and the prevention of lynching.

What explains variation in the structure and practices of collective vigilantism? I develop a framework that focuses on relations among victims and between victims and the state. I use the framework to compare variation in collective vigilantism enacted by avocado and berry sectors in Michoacán, Mexico. Centralized collective vigilantism by the avocado sector entailed a single sectoral organization coordinating victims’ extra-legal activities with no interference from local politicians. By contrast, decentralized collective vigilantism by the berry sector consisted of multiple autonomous groups of victims in conflict with criminals, local political authorities and among each other as they competed for power and resources. These differences in collective vigilantism can be traced back to differences in the local political economies that shape relations among victims and between them and the state.

Today’s Black Lives Matter movement has drawn attention to racial violence, especially lethal police violence, and compared it to the “Jim Crow” U.S. South. However, this comparison requires more specific information about racial violence during this period. Uncovering and organizing this information are the main objectives of the Burnham-Nobles Digital Archive. It documents racial killings in the American South, 1930–1954. Racial killings refer to killings where racial animus, or perceived infraction of Jim Crow norms, are documented or reasonably inferred from newspaper reports or U.S. government and civil rights organization documents. This research note discusses how the Archive contributes to basic comparative politics topics of democratic governance and subnational authoritarianism and methodological concerns, including the creation of databases used in the comparative study of collective vigilantism.