When and how do businesspeople act collectively? Manufacturers mobilized in Morocco but remained politically dormant in Tunisia in response to nearly identical incentives and challenges from global markets. New economic conditions created cleavages in the business class in both countries, but these cleavages were only politicized to the extent that producer groups mobilized. The ability to generate a cohesive class identity, which arose in response to perceived threats from other producer factions, was critical for successful business collective action. These findings call into question key assumptions in theories of collective action and introduce a new approach to globalization and domestic politics.

Financial sector reform in sub-Saharan Africa differed cross-nationally in the 1990s. The differences are traceable in part to variations in the strength and autonomy of private capital in each country. One register of the differences is concentration and ownership structure in the commercial banking sector. Variation in banking structure in African countries can be analyzed according to a typology; each system tends to produce a characteristic pattern of banking sector reform (or nonreform). A variety of transitions to the market can be traced in Africa, and they are contributing to continuing differentiation across states.

Authoritarian renewal followed the initial phase of democratic reform in Africa in the early 1990s. Most studies of authoritarian restoration analyze the hijack of democratic transition in formal political institutions like elections, parliaments, and the judiciary. However, incumbent authoritarian elites also resort simultaneously to cultural and symbolic strategies. Cultural performances enacted by incumbent authoritarian elites, like presidential tours in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, contributed to the restoration of authoritarian rule by disseminating signals that strengthened ruling elites’ positions and weakened prodemocracy forces.

During the 1980s macroeconomic crises and globalization pressures brought Latin American governments, both conservative and populist, to implement market-oriented reforms. Despite policy convergence, sectoral policies, which concentrate their effects on core supporters but are not salient for the median voter, could still be used to demonstrate partisan policymaking. Labor-linked parties used labor market regulation to keep labor supporters when facing political uncertainty despite regional convergence toward labor market deregulation. Incumbent labor-linked parties used labor reforms to keep labor allies because their effects were concentrated on formal workers who were already organized and had previous partisan alliances but did not change the preferences of the median voter.

How do English language instruction policies relate to economic strategies geared toward export growth. Historically, economic pressures for English instruction were evident in Singapore, Ireland, and Puerto Rico, but language curricula have not been uniformly adapted to the requirements of export-led industrialization. Language curricula have been adopted as a result of dominant party consolidation, nation building, and interest group politics, as well as the implementation of an economic strategy for which English proficiency is an important component. Language policies have been adapted to the requirements of an export-oriented economic policy in different ways and to different degrees.

The war on terrorism has led the American government to make noteworthy changes in the balance it strikes between national security and the protection of personal privacy. These changes include a loosening of statutory constraints upon surveillance activities, a diminution of executive accountability, and a redefinition of the functions of agencies typically involved in intelligence gathering. This shift, while a serious cause of concern, has not yet undermined fundamental rights protections in the U.S. A comparison of internet surveillance policy in the U.S. and Great Britain is used to assess the arguments of five recent books about the USA Patriot Act.

While the anchoring or encapsulation of the vote in social cleavages can serve as an important source of electoral stability in party systems, a simple determinist socioeconomic model is inadequate in explaining varying levels of interbloc volatility. An explanation of electoral volatility must also take into consideration the role played by political elites in crafting key political institutions that channel parties’ programmatic offerings and mobilize voters. Initial decisions by elites to establish mass-based cleavage parties, as compared with organizationally thin electoralist parties, help account for the extent to which parties impose significant institutional constraints on subsequent patterns of electoral behavior.

In the Elf Aquitaine scandals the informality of French politics prevented control agencies from preventing corruption. A principal-agent approach and lessons drawn from political economy applications of network theory show how individuals nested informal groups in formal associations to conceal criminal activities and engage in corruption. In contrast to studies of corruption in developed countries, policy dysfunction is not explained as a failure of formal institutions. Rather, concentration on informal institutions applies methods commonly used to explain corruption in developing countries. The nested network enabled unscrupulous executives at Elf to enrich themselves and other officials in both Europe and Africa.

It is widely thought that oil and democracy do not mix. Rentier states need not tax their citizens, thus breaking a crucial link between citizens and their governments and dimming the prospects for democracy. The link between rentierism and democracy is examined using a cross-regional dataset. Particular attention is paid to the possibility that there are both positive and negative effects of rentierism on democracy. Consistent support is not found for the notion that there is a net negative effect of rentierism on the prospects that a country will be democratic. Instead, democracy scores in the surrounding region are strongly correlated with a country’s own democracy score.

The separation of religion and state in western democracies and the Middle East is examined using five measures from the Religion and State dataset: the official relationship between religion and the state, the comparative treatment of different religions, discrimination against minority religions, regulation of the majority religion, and religious legislation. The results show that, while all the these factors are more prevalent in the Middle East, all of them are also present in at least some western democracies. Also, all western democracies except for the U.S. have at least some of these five forms of government entanglement with religion. These results imply that the U.S. separation of religion and the state is the exception for liberal democracies rather than the rule and that religious democracy, including Islamic democracy, is possible.

Decentralization’s welfare effects on economic reform are dependent upon crucial political conditions that are left unanalyzed in the conventional theories of fiscal and market-preserving federalism. This lacuna can be addressed only if decentralization is disaggregated along its different political and economic dimensions and the combined effect of the two dimensions is then reanalyzed. Certain political dimensions provide linkage mechanisms between regional and national politicians, making economic reform self-enforcing. Three such mechanisms — of authority, institutions, and personnel — are identified and used to compare India’s and China’s reform trajectories.

Many new democracies and perhaps even some older democracies do not appear to be functioning as democracies should. Politicians ignore public opinion, go back on their campaign promises, and are not held accountable at elections. The five books under review chart a new research program that addresses these issues. They attempt to measure the presence of responsiveness, mandates, and accountability and explain their causes. This new agenda might be termed the quality of democracy, and it constitutes the next step in research on democratization.

During the 1990s Russia appeared to be a classic example of the perils of federalism in political transition. Powerful ethnically based republics challenged the center on key reforms, and a weak federal government appeared unable to counter their claims to sovereignty. Since the election of 2000, however, regional prerogatives have been substantially curtailed. An assertive center has dramatically reined in much more pliant republics. How could the center roll back the regions’ privileges so quickly? In fact, republic sovereignty was seriously limited. Federal authorities retained key controls over local resources, and federal inability to create effective market institutions constrained regional opportunities to develop countervailing external ties.

Political party development in transitional polities can usefully be understood to emerge from imperfect competition in a market for electoral services in which candidates are consumers. The roots of weak party development are potentially to be found not only in institutional design and social cleavages, but also in the possible presence of strong party substitutes capable of successfully competing against parties in such markets. This model is shown to offer a solution to seemingly contradictory findings. It is backed by an original dataset on candidates and voting patterns in the understudied single member district half of Russia’s parliamentary elections.

Economic development produces two types of environmental movement: pollution-driven protests and world-view motivated nongovernmental organizations. These different types require different political opportunities and therefore interact with the political process in different ways. Local environmental protests are mainly materialistic and do not challenge the political structure in fundamental ways. The political opportunity they require is not large, and they do not play a decisive role in political transition. Nongovernmental environmental organizations, in contrast, require the redefinition of state-society relations. They demand more political space, challenge the authoritarian political structure, and play a much bigger role in political transition. With democratization, environmental movements become a serious political actor and ally for political elites.

Who participates in demonstrations? Analyses of participants have emphasized the role of political disaffection, strategic resources, and context. Against the backdrop of the rise of protest politics in both older and newer democracies, this article addresses the question by focusing on Belgium, a postindustrial society that exemplifies changes in protest politics and can be studied through detailed surveys of participants in demonstrations. Demonstrators are similar to the Belgian population in general. There is little evidence that they are antistate radicals. Yet some significant social, attitudinal, and behavioral contrasts demarcate different groups of demonstrators. Far from threatening the state, demonstrations have become a major channel of public participation in democracies.

African regimes’ repressive strategies changed during the post-1989 wave of democratization. Conventional methods of coercion—targeting of the opposition by the official security forces—were insufficient and costly in multiparty regimes. Democratization enfranchised the opposition and broadened the range of political challengers to include rural constituencies and entire ethnic groups. Furthermore, human rights abuses raised the threat of international sanctions at a much lower threshold than during the cold war. Rulers in Kenya and Rwanda responded by privatizing state violence. Privatized repression allowed them to neutralize widespread challenges, while distancing themselves from political violence to minimize friction with aid donors.

The patron-client, patrimonial or elite democracy, and neocolonial or dependency frameworks have been the three prominent interpretations of Philippine politics. New interpretations — the patrimonial oligarchic state, bossism, and the clientelist electoral regime — are essentially variations of the patrimonial/elite democracy framework. Both old and new interpretations suffer from a critical weakness: a one-sided, top-down view of Philippine politics. An alternative interpretation is contested democracy, combining the frameworks of elite democracy and democracy from below. Philippine politics is characterized by a contestation between a patrimonial elite that promotes a minimalist view of democracy and subordinate classes and ethnic communities that want a more participatory and egalitarian democracy.

Chile and Uruguay have not figured prominently in the theoretical debate over decentralization. Absent from each are the types of powerful subnational actors who have forced national politicians to decentralize in many countries in recent years. Nevertheless, national politicians in both countries decided to decentralize in pursuit of partisan advantages, demonstrating that decentralization can occur even when subnational officials are structurally weak within their parties. Decentralization has delivered several gains anticipated by reformers, but it has also created important new challenges, including the weakening of traditional sources of national control over subnational officials.

A comparative examination of the initial phases of market reform in Chile and Argentina reveals a merging of traditional elements of Latin American patrimonialism with the market reform agenda of technocrats. In both cases, patrimonial leaders and methods played an essential role in getting market reform under way and in keeping it on track. Patrimonial leaders and methods contributed to the concentration of political power and to the nature of the reform process. Such methods had a nefarious impact on market reform policy outcomes. The commonality of patrimonial features and their importance in breaking down political resistance under military and electoral democratic regimes suggests the resilience and persistence of patrimonial norms and behaviors, especially in times of crisis. They will remain a powerful challenge to democracy.

Recent theoretical arguments on judicial policy implementation posit a public enforcement mechanism for judicial decisions that challenge governmental authority. While this mechanism nicely links insights from both positive and normative theories of compliance, it raises two issues. First, there is a distinction between the degree of support constituents may afford a court and the real political costs people are capable of imposing on their recalcitrant representatives. Second, insofar as information concerning the nature of the conflicts high courts resolve is purported to be vital to the possibility of public enforcement, public officials should be expected to attempt to influence the information available to their constituents.

Oil contributed to civil war in the Republic of Congo, but this conflict would never have arisen in the first place had democratization not generated substantial political instability. Once the fighting began, moreover, petroleum’s overall effect was ambiguous. Oil tempted elites to fight, but the oil fields’ remote location also limited most combat to the capital city. Later, oil money helped underwrite a 1999 peace settlement. Despite polarization among Congo’s three main ethnoregional groups, the country did not fracture into ethnic, secessionist, or warlord zones. Thus, Congo qualifies prevailing theories linking natural primary commodities and civil war.

Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy has begun to change. On one side, in the wake of economic crisis Malaysia’s politics started to unravel in fuller democracy. Analysis is guided by the work of Haggard and Kaufman on crises and democratic transitions. More recently, though, amid partial economic recovery, the government has checked democratizing pressures. Nonetheless, it has been unable to reequilibrate its pseudo-democracy fully, prompting it to tighten the regime in a baser form of authoritarianism. After having persisted for three deccades, Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy has lost resilience.

This article reviews three recent books that explore the social and political foundations of the regulatory changes in the governance of British society and economy. Beyond privatization, there is increasing delegation to autonomous agencies, formalization of relationships, and proliferation of new technologies of regulation in both public and private spheres. Sociolegal, public administration, and political economic perspectives can help explore the forces that shape these new institutions. The notion of regulatory society accompanies the rise of the regulatory state.

Conditionality has had negative effects on neoliberal reform in Africa, and scholars now contend that governmental commitment to reforms, rather than conditionality, yields success. This article explores the dilemmas of commitment and the complexity of success in two highly praised reformers to establish a benchmark against which to judge reform in other countries. Commitment is a protracted negotiation between the state and social actors. Furthermore, even in successful cases, restructuring is the product of a dynamic interaction between institutional legacies and the policy choices of engaged agents and results in varied trajectories. Lastly, new alliances and fissures generated by structural change may undermine reform success over time.

In the 1990s presidents Menem of Argentina and Cardoso of Brazil reduced their countries’ chronic inflation rates to close to zero. Not since 1944 in Argentina and 1937 in Brazil had inflation stayed so low for so long. How did these leaders succeed where so many had failed? Models of the political economy of reform, which focus on crisis, the electoral calendar, wars of attrition, party control of veto points, or the enhanced credibility of left-wing converts to neoliberalism, do not provide convincing explanations. Success depended instead on other particular tactical choices. The article identifies the stakeholders impeding reform and analyzes Cardoso’s and Menem’s tactics to marginalize some while coopting others.

Recruitment, electoral contestation, political socialization, interest aggregation, and organizational resources of political parties have contributed to the consolidation of democratic processes in Ghana. Despite a turbulent political history, including several long military regimes, a two-way cleavage has evolved into a virtual two party system that advances consolidation processes. Elections over four republics have remained highly competitive, and governance has alternated almost equally between the two sides of the cleavage. Their shared dominance over forty-four years has significantly strengthened their command of recruitment, socialization, and interest aggregation. While organizational resources remain weak, a strong electoral commission and robust media have added managerial heft and extensive public exposure. On balance, democratic consolidation processes, and perhaps system consolidation, are well along.

Democracy is generally defined as a combination of procedures and inclusiveness, but inclusiveness has presented a challenge for comparative historical theories of democratization since they operationalize their dependent variable with universal adult male suffrage as the standard of inclusiveness. Raising the bar to include women is an important first step in revamping theories of democratization, but it is also necessary to incorporate gender and race as categories of analysis even when the group being enfranchised is white working class men. Two additional variables, transnational activism and historical timing, are important for theories of democratization.

The applicability of rational choice models is dependent upon the levels of stability and certainty in the political area. This point can be demonstrated through an analysis of the politics of preserving electoral systems, in particular, through a critique of a rational choice analysis of Israel. The very nature of the arenas in which electoral reform was adopted in the 1990s, in Israel and other established democracies, and the nature of the proposed reforms make this subject unsuitable for study through the rational choice paradigm. An alternative analysis of Israel and an alternative approach that can incorporate these inherent complexities would be more appropriate.

A first generation of studies of the causes and consequences of decentralization and federalism viewed decentralization as a simple zero-sum transfer of authority from the center to subnational governments, drew upon the assumptions of welfare economics and public choice theory, and employed blunt measures of expenditure decentralization and federalism. More detailed pictures of decentralization and federalism that help explain the growing disjuncture between theory and cross-national evidence can be obtained by defining several alternative forms of federalism and fiscal, policy, and political decentralization, then measuring them and exploring interrelationships across countries and time. This approach points the way toward a second generation of more nuanced empirical research that takes politics and institutions seriously.