Standard theories about elections in Africa suggest that they are little more than ethnic headcounts. Data from an exit poll conducted on Election Day in Ghana’s 2008 election challenges this view. The two main parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP), drew support from many ethnic groups; and there was little evidence of ethnic block voting. Rather, voters’ beliefs about the parties and incumbent performance were the main determinants of vote choice. Evaluations of the attributes of the NDC and NPP shaped the outcome of Ghana’s 2008 election far more than the ethnic identity of the candidates. These results hold important implications for understanding voting, parties, and government performance in multiethnic democracies.

The antigovernment protests that erupted in one ethnic region of Ethiopia can be attributed to the group’s historical grievances or to its access to mobilizing resources. However, conventional explanations are insufficient in accounting for protest patterns in terms of their geographic distribution or varying levels of violence. The likelihood of protest onset was inversely related to local heterogeneity, intraethnic as well as interethnic. Protest violence spiraled through the interaction between ethnic homogeneity and the government’s policing strategy. Woundings were less likely to occur in localities where protesters were repressed by police forces staffed by their own co-ethnics.

Latin America’s political economy has shifted in the three decades since the return to democratization, with the inflationary crises of the 1980s fading into the past. One consequence of this change is a reduction in the electoral salience of inflation. While electoral support for the incumbent in the 1980s and 1990s was strongly tied to his or her ability to prevent increases in prices, in the 2000–2010 period there was no significant association between inflation rates and election outcomes. Instead, incumbents who presided over a growing economy in the last decade reaped electoral benefits. The importance of the economy for electoral outcomes varies over time and even across economic indicators.

Latin American women are less likely than Latin American men to express a preference for democracy. This gender gap in support for democracy is partly a function of the level of attachment that women as a group have for the democratic regime, and this level of attachment is determined by the mode in which democratic transition occurs. Four models examining the gendered attitude-toward-regime decision in seventeen countries over four time periods show that when women are involved as significant political actors at the time of the democratic transition, their support for democracy varies in ways similar to their male counterparts. When women have lesser roles, gender specific behaviors emerge.

Why did a highly redistributive, nationalized health care system emerge in the UK, where the Left was comparatively weak, while a more redistributively neutral, cash-centric, insurance-based system was pursued in Sweden, where the Left was strong? The explanation is two fold. First, in contrast to the Swedish Social Democrats, the weakness of the British Labour Party constrained it to pursue redistribution via health policy. Second, given the redistributive goals of the National Health Service, it became imperative for the Labour Party to construct a system that would be difficult for future Conservative governments to retrench. More generally, this formulation posits rational actors operating in the kinds of processes typically studied by historical institutionalists. The result is a tendency for a type of path dependence by design.

The tension between immigration and redistribution has attracted increased attention in recent years. Many authors argue, based on economic self-interest theory, that there is a negative relationship between support for redistribution and preferred levels of immigration. Notwithstanding the role of economic self-interest, there is in fact a multitude of motivations that moderate the relationship between preferences for redistribution and attitudes toward immigration. A model of preferences for immigration shows that self-interested and strongly reciprocal individuals experience a tension between immigration and redistribution, while egalitarians do not experience this tension. Humanitarians express a general willingness to help those who are worse off, immigrants included, but this motivation does not affect their preferences for redistribution.

Scholars have made substantial progress toward understanding the connections between ethnic relations and civil war, but important theoretical and empirical gaps remain. Existing explanations often ignore the constructivist origins of ethnic group formation, or are too proximate to the outcome under investigation, so that the link between ethnic political competition and ethnic violence is difficult to pick apart. An alternative approach is an explanation of ethnic violence rooted in the microfoundations of social identity theory (SIT). When states consistently employ ethnic categories across institutions, they lay the foundation for conflicts over status and power, facilitating recruitment and mobilization on the basis of emotion-laden intergroup comparisons and competition. The strength of these claims is demonstrated through a comparative-historical analysis of ethnic violence in eleven Southern African countries.

Surprisingly, waves of political regime contention in Europe have slowed down through history but have achieved more success in triggering advances toward democracy, as a comparison of the revolutions of 1848 and 1917—1919 shows. Major organizational developments account for these inverse trends. Before political mass organizations arose, ordinary people decided whether to emulate foreign challenges to established autocrats. Short on information, citizens relied heavily on inferential shortcuts and acted rashly, with little success. After the rise of mass organizations, common people took cues from their representative leaders, who had more information and greater processing capacity. Before emulating an external precedent and challenging their ruler, leaders waited for propitious circumstances. Therefore, twentieth century regime contention diffused more slowly yet with greater success.

Theories of environmental outcomes have been developed mostly through large-N cross-national studies, which have a structuralist bias and rely heavily on correlations. Structured, focused case studies can help overcome those limitations by incorporating political processes and identifying causal mechanisms. Climate policy outcomes in Germany vary greatly across policy areas such as emissions target setting, the economic transformation of eastern Germany, renewable energy, ecological tax reform, voluntary agreements with industry, emissions trading, and unregulated increases in the consumption of household heating, transportation, and electricity. Comparative analysis of nine case studies indicates that environmental outcome theories should more fully include external focusing events, advocacy coalition formation, multiple paths of influence for green parties, and the negative effects of neocorporatism and unregulated technological change and consumption.

Why do party systems in longstanding democracies sometimes experience sudden change? Neither sociological nor institutional explanations can account for the swift increase in support for regional political parties in India in the 1990s. Instead, the shift from single-party majority to coalition government explains the rise of regional parties. The advent of coalition government increased the incentives associated with joining and establishing regional parties, prompting many already popular politicians to leave their national parties and take their supporters with them as they formed new regional parties in the 1990s. This finding reverses the causal arrow that usually links party systems and coalition government and illustrates how noninstitutional elements of the political context can determine elite incentives and thereby shape party systems.

Party brokers have information about voters’ political preferences and likelihood of turning out to vote, and are able to target clientelistic inducements and monitor voter participation in exchange for voters’ electoral support. However, brokers may also use the clientelistic inducements they receive from bosses to pursue their personal enrichment, at the cost of lost votes for their party. An original dataset tracing the political careers of 137 municipal candidates in Argentina shows how bosses combine information from voter turnout at rallies and elections. By comparing a broker’s ability to mobilize voters, bosses are able to make inferences about reliable brokers who will distribute party goods to voters, and unreliable brokers who will use party goods to pad their own pockets.

Until recently the mass murder and civil war scholarships developed alongside each other without engaging in fruitful dialogue or building on one another’s insights and findings. However, as the reviewed books demonstrate, following the “micropolitical turn” in the study of civil war, and with the genocide scholarship moving away from the state-centered approach, there is a convergence between the two literatures. The new wave of research on mass violence builds on the findings and theories of the civil conflict literature, proposes ways in which each field can contribute to its counterpart, and puts forward new questions and research agendas for further research on mass violence.

“Rituals of respect” are recurrent, public, and reciprocal political practices. In Sufi-majority Senegal, such practices first facilitated accommodation among a variety of groups in potential conflict, and later facilitated tolerance, then respect, and eventually democracy. The social construction of horizontal rituals of respect between religious groups, especially Sufis and Catholics, and reciprocal vertical rituals of respect between the secular state and virtually all religious groups, have created this “twin tolerations”- friendly environment. Three of the major dimensions of this pattern—a “co-celebratory” dimension of diverse religions, a consensual state-religion “policy cooperation” dimension, and a “principled distance” dimension of support for human rights and democracy—are also prominent in several countries which have large Muslim populations and are widely seen as having been democracies for the last ten years, namely, Indonesia, India, and Albania.

In the United States, considerable evidence documents the power of partisanship to shape voter preferences. But does partisanship have similar powers beyond American shores? Observational evidence leads some in this old debate to answer yes, but others to contend partisanship merely restates party vote. Experimentation can clarify what powers, if any, partisanship wields over voters in specific countries. If effects differ across countries, then scholars can turn their attention to explaining why. Survey experiments conducted in three countries where multiple parties viably compete for legislative seats—Great Britain, Hungary, and Poland—demonstrate that, when cues are available, party identifiers often follow their party’s lead when expressing policy preferences. However, the pattern of results suggests this power may strengthen with party system crystallization.

Has democratization in Mexico begun to tilt policies in favor of consumers and away from entrenched interest groups, as some scholars predict? Evidence from post-crisis banking reform efforts during 1995 to 2000 suggests that a sharp increase in interparty electoral competition did have salutary effects for consumers. It created incentives for the PRI government, with legislative support from the PAN, to improve capital adequacy and liberalize foreign investment that stabilized the banking system. However, high party discipline—low intraparty competition—created incentives for the PRI-PAN to collude to implement profit-padding regulations that benefitted bankers and harmed consumers. Party discipline appears to be a significant obstacle for consumer-friendly regulatory reforms in Mexico.

Existing explanations of judicial reform emphasize the positive effects of electoral competition. However, multiple, competing, and even contradictory mechanisms behind this association obfuscate causation, and variation in the timing and content of reforms remains puzzling for these accounts. Leveraging a “most similar” comparative design at the subnational level across three Mexican states, and drawing on archival analysis and interviews with judges and other legal elites, principled ideological factors are found to shape judicial reform. That is, judicial reform is less a mechanical side effect of increasing electoral competition and more the product of principled, purposeful action. These findings emphasize the role of agency and ideas in building democratic institutions.

What determines the identity category to which individuals feel they most belong? What is the political significance of one’s proclaimed identity? Recent research addresses these questions using surveys that explicitly ask individuals about their identity. Yet little is known about the nature of the attachments conveyed in responses to identity questions. The findings of a set of studies and experiments investigating these reported attachments suggest that the purported identity captured in survey responses varies significantly within subjects over time; changes in people’s primary identity can be highly influenced by situational triggers; and changes in purported self-identity do not imply a corresponding change in policy preferences. These results are drawn from three studies that vary in terms of design, country sample, and research instrument.

Scholarship on the politics of immigration has increased impressively among political scientists and scholars of comparative politics. The books analyzed in this review all synthesize and, in their own way, build upon the literature that has evolved over the past two decades, addressing questions at the core of this literature or posing new questions. Perhaps most important, each takes a comparative approach to the politics of immigration, focusing on post-World War II immigration policies in Western Europe; variations in immigrant conflict among different immigrant groups, across localities and cross-nationally; differences in citizenship policy among countries at similar levels of development and changes in well-established policies over time; and the connections between naturalization policy and naturalization rates and the historical relationship of colonizing, noncolonizing, and settler countries with immigrant populations.

How have Mexico’s community-based democratic institutions, known as Usos y Costumbres (UyC) or Uses and Customs systems, affected local and national politics? Although informal UyC practices exist throughout Mexico, the state of Oaxaca formally changed its electoral codes in 1995 to legalize UyC. Statistical analysis of national election results shows that Oaxacan municipalities that formally adopted UyC systems thereafter experienced higher first-place party margins and higher levels of abstention compared to non-UyC systems. That these systems helped local leaders engineer election outcomes while reducing participation, even in national elections, undermines arguments about their democratic benefits. UyC rules appear to help preserve local authoritarian enclaves, with negative consequences for national democracy.

Looking at young immigrants from low-trust, non-Western countries in the high-trust society of Denmark, two perspectives on how generalized trust is formed can be examined. The first is a cultural perspective emphasizing that trust is a stable cultural trait passed on from one generation to the next through parental socialization. The second is an experiential perspective emphasizing the role of perceptions of fairness of state institutions concerning equal treatment of immigrants and natives. Building on a new Danish survey, results show that both parental transmission of trust as well as perceptions of institutional fairness matter for the level of trust of young immigrants, but the impact of the latter is considerably stronger. Additional analyses show that these perceptions are mainly formed by concrete experiences of fairness of teachers in school.

In recent decades, the number of national level ombudsmen has more than quintupled. The institution now exists in about 120 states, many of which are new democracies, hybrid regimes, or states undergoing regime transition. Some ombudsmen are powerful and influential; others are weak and marginalized. This variation can be explained by three factors: (1) the type of regime under which the institution was created; (2) whether the ombudsman challenges the government; and (3) the ombudsman’s ability to build coalitions with other actors. Though counterintuitive, more powerful ombudsmen are those created before the transition to democracy. The implication of this argument is that the creation of ombudsmen should precede rather than follow the formal transition to democracy.

Two main weaknesses of the new institutionalism literature, one associated with veto player theories and the other with path dependency theories, help account for the framework’s inadequacy in theorizing change, especially radical change. A comparison of the divergent development of public aid to private schools in three countries—Australia, New Zealand, and the United States—demonstrates the importance of two factors that potentially mitigate the status quo—preserving effect of veto points and path dependency: the multifaceted nature of veto points and the political clout of status quo challengers. Even in what initially appear to be highly constrained institutional systems, significant reform can occur, at either a rapid or slow pace.

How do changes in the structure of political opportunities and threats shape movement- countermovement interaction in composite regimes where different groups within the population are divided along ethnonational lines? In cases where one movement is structurally disadvantaged and the other is structurally advantaged, valuable theoretical insights into movement-countermovement interaction can be generated. Employing the case of the Palestinian and Jewish settler movements during the 1987—1992 Intifada, three theoretical propositions are critically examined as they relate to how changes in the structure of political opportunities and threats influence the emergence and endurance of movement-countermovement interaction, the strategy and tactics of both movements, and the internal dynamics within each.

The study of authoritarian regimes has become one of the hottest subfields in comparative politics over the last decade. The books covered in this review take up the critical questions of how authoritarian regimes are created and maintained. While this research program has profitably opened up the black box of authoritarian polities and taken their institutions seriously, there has been an asymmetric attention to the quasi-democratic features of these regimes—such as political parties and legislatures—at the expense of their coercive ones. Future work in this area would do well to address this imbalance, as well as to provide richer explanations of how institutions matter and better evidence of their effects.

The events of the Arab Spring have suggested the necessity of rethinking the logic of authoritarian persistence in the Arab world. However, the internal variation in regime collapse and survival observed in the region confirms earlier analyses that the comportment of the coercive apparatus, especially its varying will to repress, is pivotal to determining the durability of the authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the trajectory of the Arab Spring highlights an empirical novelty for the Arab world, namely, the manifestation of huge, cross-class, popular protest in the name of political change, as well as a new factor that abetted the materialization of this phenomenon—the spread of social media. The latter will no doubt be a game changer for the longevity of authoritarian regimes worldwide from now on.

How does the strength of a state’s coercive apparatus under autocracy affect the likelihood of democratic transition? While a broad range of literature posits a negative link between repression and democracy, empirical models of the determinants of democratization rarely include measures that capture this relationship. An original panel dataset with a global scope from 1950?2002 enables an empirical assessment of whether coercive capacity is negatively associated with democracy. The dataset demonstrates that increased coercive capacity under autocracy has a strong, robust negative impact on both a country’s level of democracy as well as the likelihood of democratization. The analysis suggests that empirical studies of democratization should include measures of repression to account for the widely assumed link between coercive capacity and autocracy.

Much of the scholarly debate over Islam and democracy has centered on what has been referred to as the “inclusion-moderation hypothesis,” and whether democratic institutions are capable of incorporating hostile religious actors. To build on this debate, the concept of inclusion and the expectations about its political effects should be broadened to include the interaction between religion-state relationships and democratization processes in predominantly Muslim societies. Inviting ambivalently democratic religious actors into the public democratic space produces dynamics of both political moderation and religious change. The mechanisms of this theoretical model can be evaluated by tracing the evolution of two Islamist political parties in Algeria, the MSP-Hamas and Ennahda-Islah.

The changing nature of state-business relations in China can be analyzed in light of recent privatization experiences. Drawing on an analytical framework based on statist literature, the pervasive governance problems occurring during the privatization of local government-owned firms can be explained by two contributing factors. These are the state’s declining capacity to regulate the market and its reduced autonomy from emerging elites. Consequently, local states were transformed from those in which there was “embedded autonomy” to those with a “clientelistic” form. Thus, the conventional wisdom that local states have played a positive role in China’s economic development is subject to question. A more nuanced understanding of cronyism helps explain the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and capitalists.

Decentralization advances patronage politics in distinct ways. First, in decentralized states both central and local politicians distribute patronage to enhance their political support. Second, local elections reveal information to central leaders about the geographic distribution of electorally salient voters. Central leaders can use this information to target particularistic benefits to these voters. Third, elected local politicians have individual strategies to distribute patronage, in spite of or in addition to the clientelistic strategies of the political parties they represent. Evidence from India indicates that decentralization has contributed to more extensive distribution of patronage in decentralized states. Data from Indian states and villages illustrates the incentives at the state and local levels that shape the distribution of patronage.

Many theories attempt to explain European Union (EU) integration—the gradual and voluntary transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational level of governance—but few studies have addressed this phenomenon from a grassroots perspective. The books under review shed light on the human dimension of EU integration, utilizing sociological and ethnographic approaches. In particular, these recent studies show how sociological approaches to political science can breathe life into a debate that is oftentimes too academic and theoretically inconclusive. They address a number of questions about the future of Europe, including the extent to which EU citizens identify with Europe and the legitimacy of EU integration in the eyes of European citizens.