Volume 55, Number 4, July 2023

This article presents a novel argument about what enables democracies to survive when executives attempt to weaken institutional constraints. We argue that democracies erode because (1) an illiberal executive attempts to undermine democracy and (2) this executive commands a majority in the national legislature. Democracies survive if the executive is not deeply illiberal or if the opposition controls a majority of the national legislature. The empirical section presents data about executive illiberalism and the balance of power in the national legislature for thirteen Latin American presidents. We test our argument in four negative cases (episodes) in Argentina since 1983. We use primary sources including 125 original interviews to explain how two presidents who attempted to centralize power fell short of eroding democracy.

What explains the militarization of public safety? Despite its failures, police militarization remains a popular policy. Existing scholarship has mainly focused on the police adopting military weapons and tactics but has neglected a silent but consequential type: the appointment of military members as police chiefs. Whereas the conventional wisdom points to partisanship and violence as key drivers, I argue that the militarization of police leaders responds to political motives. Based on a novel data set on 5,580 appointments in Mexico and repeated event history analysis, I find evidence of a top-down militarization sequence. Mayors are more likely to appoint military chiefs when upper levels of government and peers embrace a militarized security strategy. I further illustrate how coercive pressures and strategic incentives drive this sequence.

Recent scholarship on resource politics has found that the “resource curse” is largely specific to the Persian Gulf states in which British oil interests ensured the survival of small states. However, this does not present the entire picture of the relationship between oil and sovereignty. I argue that oil was also involved in the process in which the region protected by colonial powers was divided into certain states out of many possible territorial arrangements, creating states that would otherwise not exist. Based on extensive archival research, I show that when nine Gulf sheikhdoms negotiated under Abu Dhabi’s initiative to create a federation, (1) oil production during the colonial period and (2) the protectorate system led Qatar and Bahrain to reject it and achieve sovereignty separately.

Despite the government’s enormous efforts to forestall widespread protests, China still witnessed many cross-provincial protests in the post-1989 era. How did Chinese citizens find the opportunity to stage cross-provincial protests in a political environment highly hostile to coordination beyond the community level? By tackling this puzzle, this study illuminates the Chinese state’s sophisticatedly differentiated strategies for coping with collective protests. Rather than attribute state leaders’ threat perceptions to static dimensions of protest movements, we posit that dynamic dimensions such as the pathway of scale shift often play a more important role. We propose a typology of pathways through which local protests spread across provincial borders—top-down, outside-in, and bottom-up—and elucidate how the interaction between the pathways and the nature of solidarity shaped government perception and strategy. Besides addressing an important puzzle in China and enhancing our understanding of the political environment in high-capacity authoritarian regimes, this study also underscores how an investigation of dynamic dimensions can provide new insights into the government’s calculations and strategies for managing popular protests.

Research on the international dimension of authoritarianism and democratization has focused on patron-client interaction. This article identifies a specific type of international involvement that is characterized by geopolitical competition. In “international competitive involvement,” multiple rival countries intervene simultaneously and oppositely to support opposing sides during a political transition, namely the military and a faction from the civilian actors. Drawing on evidence from Egypt, Sudan, and Myanmar, I develop a theoretical framework for this type of international involvement and argue that it significantly enhances the military’s repressive capacity and hardens its negotiation position. While the military in cases of non-competitive support perceives of bargaining as a potential option, competitive involvement forecloses the bargaining option as repression becomes the most viable course of action for the military.

Does civil resistance work? Research emphasizes the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance over violent resistance in achieving campaign goals, with the seminal study Why Civil Resistance Works (WCRW) by Chenoweth and Stephan being the main point of reference to date. I revisit this pivotal finding in three steps. First, I reproduce WCRW’s results on nonviolent effectiveness. Second, I discuss how cases may have been overlooked due to a streetlight effect. Third, I quantify the results’ sensitivity using simulations. I find that WCRW’s main findings on nonviolent effectiveness are highly sensitive to variable selection, under-coverage bias, bootstrapping, and omitted variable bias. As a routine reference in scholarship and the public discourse, assessing the robustness of WCRW’s findings is relevant to practitioners and researchers.