Volume 43, Number 1, October 2010

The tradition of historical political sociology has produced highly sophisticated explanations of variations in national political regimes. However, a series of false debates has interfered with further progress. Whereas the various hypotheses in conflict within historical political sociology are substantially more similar than it seems, the outcomes explained are actually different. Even the most antagonistic perspectives—neo-Marxism and neo-Weberianism—have two theoretical underpinnings in common—a conceptual framework centered on the notion of power and an explanatory logic that views national political regimes as local adaptations to a universal transformation in the organization of power. Rather than opposite explanations of the same aggregate outcome, they should be understood as mutually independent hypotheses about the different components of political regimes.

Comparative scholarship conceives of party systems nationally. This has created a situation of conceptual and measurement incompleteness in the study of party systems. The effects of subnational variations in party competition on national politics and the quality of democracy cannot be understood if subnational party systems continue to be erased from the theoretical mapping of party politics. The concept of “federalized party systems” denotes systems composed of national and subnational party subsystems. Its value for the comparative and longitudinal study of party politics can be demonstrated through an analysis of Argentina’s federalized party system.

A decade after Mexico’s watershed 2000 election, Mexicans are disillusioned with democracy and distrustful of politicians, parties, and parliament. Evidence from an original survey, Desencanto Ciudadano en México, indicates that Mexicans’ definitions of democracy play an important role in shaping how satisfied they are with it. Those holding a “substantive” definition of democracy emphasizing socioeconomic improvement tied to redistribution are significantly less satisfied with democracy than “liberal” democrats, who stress rights, or “electoral” democrats, who emphasize procedures. Citizen expectations of democracy are an important but missing ingredient in studies of political disillusionment. Dissatisfaction is worrisome because of its impact on political behavior. The disenchanted vote less, are less involved civically, and engage more in legal and illegal protest.

Many studies suggests a harsh trade off, referred to as the “the new liberal dilemma,” between diversity and immigration and social capital. However, the relationship between immigrant status and trust can be better gauged by considering three interaction variables. First, informal neighbor interaction cushions the negative immigrant effect. Second, a similar role is played by fair treatment by public authorities. Third, no such cushioning interaction occurs from organizational participation. Overall, the results encourage a contingent stance about diversity and social capital. The “minority culture of mistrust” can wither away as a consequence of positive experiences of social interaction and institutional fairness. Because these have a particularly positive impact among immigrants, the trust gap between immigrants and others may, under the right circumstances, be closed at high levels of these variables.

Until now, few studies have focused on states’ increasing extension of voting rights to citizens residing abroad. It is particularly striking that the right to vote from abroad has often been extended not only by democracies or transitional regimes but by authoritarian states as well. The cases of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia help explain this phenomenon. These North African experiences demonstrate that while authoritarian states often appropriate the language of citizenship, the extension of voting rights by these states has implications different from those in democratic settings. In authoritarian contexts, expanding the franchise is aimed at increasing sovereignty over expatriates with resources to be tapped or at reinforcing security through a different means of monitoring communities abroad.

Throughout the Middle East, Islamists, leftists, and other ideological streams are forming coalitions in opposition to their authoritarian regimes. Yet little research has been conducted on the conditions under which these cross-ideological coalitions fail or succeed. Three cases of successful coalition building and one case of failed coalition building in Jordan indicate that cross-ideological coalitions are initiated in the context of external threat and facilitated by organizational forms that ensure the members gain or maintain their ability to pursue their independent goals. Most important, in contrast to other studies, these cases show that the plentifulness of recruits impedes cooperation. Rather than alleviating competition, an abundance of potential recruits increases competition and hinders cross-ideological cooperation.