Volume 41, Number 3, April 2009

Stolen elections are triggering events that overcome barriers to revolutionary action against electoral authoritarian regimes. They mobilize ordinary citizens, strengthen the opposition, and divide the regime. As neoinstitutionalist theories of revolution suggest, the relative openness of electoral authoritarianism inhibits mass protest. But when elections are stolen, regimes undergo “closure,” increasing the probability of protest. Using the examples of recent democratic uprisings in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, the importance of stolen elections is examined through within-case comparisons. The failure of other potential revolutionary precipitants in these cases underscores that stolen elections are not merely replaceable final straws. Stolen elections have not only been crucial for the emergence of revolutionary situations, they have shaped outcomes as well. Linking popular mobilization to fraudulent elections has become part of the repertoire of contention of democratic revolutionaries.

The politics of national identity influences citizenship rules in new states, but not in the way that existing theories would predict. Existing theories attribute ethnic or civic citizenship laws to dominant ethnic or civic national identity conceptions, but in many new states there is no dominant national identity conception. In the post-Soviet region all civic citizenship laws emerge without the civic national identity conception. The case of Ukraine shows how civic citizenship law may be an unintended side effect of contested identity politics. The post-Soviet experience suggests that the politics of citizenship policy in new and older states is different: national identity is a major source of citizenship policies in new states, but its impact may be different from what existing theories posit.

Secularism and liberalism are often perceived as interlinked and associated with the process of modernization and liberal democracy. Studies of Israel, however, cast doubts on this linkage as antiliberal and ethnocentric attitudes remain entrenched. Secular practices, religious beliefs, and religious practices can coexist within a bricolage of beliefs and behaviors. Secular practices related to everyday life are not necessarily related to a deeper belief system and values associated with liberalism; the commercialization of the Israeli public sphere does not significantly change existing nonliberal perceptions and the structure of Israel as a nonliberal democracy. Secularism and liberalism can develop separately, and the secularization of the public sphere does not necessarily entail a commitment to religious freedom, to toleration associated with liberalism, and, consequently, to liberal democracy.

The split in the Turkish Islamist movement in 1999 between radicals and moderates and the massive electoral victory of the moderate AKP in 2002 gave rise to two major and contrasting explanations for this moderation. Either the movement had not changed because its members had retained their original religious orientations while outwardly pretending to be moderate, or they had finally become assimilated into the secularist system and had truly accepted democratic and secularist values. Yet the fact was that AKP members were neither pretending, nor were they assimilated. They were still pursuing the same interests that had played a major role in their support for the Islamist movement in the first place: their class interests.

Should women’s rights advocates pursue a politics of difference or a politics of equality? This question is addressed by coding for and analyzing the use of gender in constitutional structures in seventy-four countries. Countries with constitutional structures that emphasize women’s different needs and provide gender-based protections are compared to countries with constitutional structures that emphasize equality or gender neutrality. Examining whether these differences have a significant effect on women’s political representation and economic standing, it appears that a politics of difference based on constitutional provisions that proactively promote women’s equality in the political and economic sphere is positively associated with gender equality-especially political equality.

Recent books by Carles Boix and by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson provide bold theoretical arguments about how economic inequality can undermine the survival of democracy. Many of their key assumptions, however, are called into question by existing research on ‘third wave’ Latin American democracies. There is little evidence that the poor are more likely to vote for higher taxes or for left parties, and survey research does not indicate that poor people are more likely to think the distribution of income is unfair. More sustained examination of American democracy by Larry M. Bartels reaches parallel conclusions. A more careful examination of political economy assumptions about the relationship between actors’ objective economic circumstances and their perceived interests and behavior is needed.