Volume 38, Number 2, January 2006

Populism is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, due in part to its diverse organizational expressions. The different organizational subtypes of populism in both partisan and civic arenas are influenced but directly determined by structural and institutional conditions. A comparison of Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela demonstrates that contemporary populist figures are associated with widely varying levels of sociopolitical organization. Since popular organization is an instrument to counterbalance elite power resources, greater partisan and civic organization is likely as conflict intensifies between populist leaders and elite opponents.

Core members of a Nicaraguan mothers’ organization remained active in it even when official organizational goals lost immediacy and institutional support with the war’s end and regime change. The nonmaterial benefits of emotional support, collective identity, and empowerment can explain this participation paradox. Material benefits have limited explanatory value, as they were distributed nonselectively. Intangible benefits develop in the process of collective action. Recognition of these benefits helps explain individual motivations as well as organizational longevity. Collective action can benefit both the individual and democracy due to its potential to empower citizens.

The antiglobalization organization Attac has been successful in France but has failed in Sweden. The political process model, which includes factors such as organizational strength and political opportunity structure, can be applied to explanations of Attac’s success or failure. However, this model can not fully explain the differing fortunes of Attac in France and Sweden. The political process model needs to be amended to pay more attention to public opinion as a factor explaining the impact of challenging groups.

Social inclusion is important in peacebuilding. Fostering gender equity faces many challenges under conditions of protracted ethnic conflict. Northern Ireland offers an opportunity to examine more fully how gender equity is infused into democratic transitions from ethnic conflict. Three factors are crucial to women’s participation in peace processes and democratic transitions: the structure of political opportunities and availability of resources; women’s ability to use the human and organizational resources they had already developed in civil society; and the responsiveness of political parties to gender inclusion.

Studies of mass partisanship in Russia frame an interesting puzzle: the unexpectedly high levels of party attachments in the first two election cycles stagnated or even declined in subsequent elections. Mass-level explanations of nascent partisanship fail to account for this pattern of behavior. As a corrective to these arguments, party organizations should be incorporated as an actor in theories of partisanship. To what extent were Russian party organizations capable of projecting coherent issue positions during the electoral period? Although the mean issue positions of some parties were remarkably stable over time, the shifting structure of the party system coupled with high levels of disagreement within party organizations undermined their capacity to build ties to voters.

If ever there was a binary opposition, Niall Ferguson and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri are it. Despite their many differences in their recent books, they are equally confused about empire. The four books under review are riddled with contradictions that stem from their authors’ inability to come to grips with the concept of empire. As a result, they prove the very opposite of what they intended to prove. How have such books garnered such large readerships, and how should serious students of comparative politics proceed in studying empire? Students of empire can draw on an enormous, serious literature and research agenda.