Volume 37, Number 1, October 2004

Chile and Uruguay have not figured prominently in the theoretical debate over decentralization. Absent from each are the types of powerful subnational actors who have forced national politicians to decentralize in many countries in recent years. Nevertheless, national politicians in both countries decided to decentralize in pursuit of partisan advantages, demonstrating that decentralization can occur even when subnational officials are structurally weak within their parties. Decentralization has delivered several gains anticipated by reformers, but it has also created important new challenges, including the weakening of traditional sources of national control over subnational officials.

A comparative examination of the initial phases of market reform in Chile and Argentina reveals a merging of traditional elements of Latin American patrimonialism with the market reform agenda of technocrats. In both cases, patrimonial leaders and methods played an essential role in getting market reform under way and in keeping it on track. Patrimonial leaders and methods contributed to the concentration of political power and to the nature of the reform process. Such methods had a nefarious impact on market reform policy outcomes. The commonality of patrimonial features and their importance in breaking down political resistance under military and electoral democratic regimes suggests the resilience and persistence of patrimonial norms and behaviors, especially in times of crisis. They will remain a powerful challenge to democracy.

Recent theoretical arguments on judicial policy implementation posit a public enforcement mechanism for judicial decisions that challenge governmental authority. While this mechanism nicely links insights from both positive and normative theories of compliance, it raises two issues. First, there is a distinction between the degree of support constituents may afford a court and the real political costs people are capable of imposing on their recalcitrant representatives. Second, insofar as information concerning the nature of the conflicts high courts resolve is purported to be vital to the possibility of public enforcement, public officials should be expected to attempt to influence the information available to their constituents.

Oil contributed to civil war in the Republic of Congo, but this conflict would never have arisen in the first place had democratization not generated substantial political instability. Once the fighting began, moreover, petroleum’s overall effect was ambiguous. Oil tempted elites to fight, but the oil fields’ remote location also limited most combat to the capital city. Later, oil money helped underwrite a 1999 peace settlement. Despite polarization among Congo’s three main ethnoregional groups, the country did not fracture into ethnic, secessionist, or warlord zones. Thus, Congo qualifies prevailing theories linking natural primary commodities and civil war.

Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy has begun to change. On one side, in the wake of economic crisis Malaysia’s politics started to unravel in fuller democracy. Analysis is guided by the work of Haggard and Kaufman on crises and democratic transitions. More recently, though, amid partial economic recovery, the government has checked democratizing pressures. Nonetheless, it has been unable to reequilibrate its pseudo-democracy fully, prompting it to tighten the regime in a baser form of authoritarianism. After having persisted for three deccades, Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy has lost resilience.

This article reviews three recent books that explore the social and political foundations of the regulatory changes in the governance of British society and economy. Beyond privatization, there is increasing delegation to autonomous agencies, formalization of relationships, and proliferation of new technologies of regulation in both public and private spheres. Sociolegal, public administration, and political economic perspectives can help explore the forces that shape these new institutions. The notion of regulatory society accompanies the rise of the regulatory state.