Volume 35, Number 4, July 2003

The distinctive designs of American and Swedish tax regimes closely resemble the characteristics that would be expected from their mass and elite political cultures: individualistic and egalitarian/hierarchical, respectively. The relative influence of rival cultures among relevant organized members of a society’s political elite offers a sound predictor of policy design. Explanations of policy design characteristics grow increasingly satisfactory the more thoroughly they draw on culture and the structure of broad political institutions, both in conjunction with historical contingencies. Yet culture and social structure make distinctive contributions to the process through which policy is designed.

Pension reform is a key political issue in most western European countries but takes a different shape depending on the institutional structure of existing pension systems. There are two different models of pension provision: social insurance and multipillar pension systems. Their vulnerability to socioeconomic developments differ dramatically. Multipillar systems better withstand the demographic challenge and adapt better to internationalized financial markets, but they are less effective than social insurance systems in integrating atypical employment. The distinction between two models of pension provision also helps explain reform trajectories and suggests that the impact of decisions made decades ago will continue to influence pension policy for some time to come.

Subnational comparison can help analyze how nascent democracies construct the rule of law. Variation in judicial autonomy across two neighboring Argentine provinces is a function of interparty competition. The rule of law results from a balance of power between at least two political parties, neither of which has monolithic control; no highly disciplined party sustains control of both the legislative and executive branches. Effective party competition and low party discipline create a climate in which an autonomous judiciary can develop. In contrast, monolithic party control, defined as a prolonged period of unified government under a disciplined party, blocks development of the rule of law.

Why did cronyism impede growth in some developing countries but not in others? Theoretical analyses of transaction costs and the new institutional economics can help answer this question. A comparison of Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia shows that, if there is a situation of mutual hostages among a small and stable number of government and business actors, cronyism can reduce transaction costs and minimize deadweight losses, while a situation in which there are either too few or too many actors increases deadweight losses through corruption.

Comparative politics approaches the question of the appropriate role of the state in economic life through a nation-centric prism. India, a crucial but puzzling case, offers an alternative framework. The search for developmental states has until now proceeded at too aggregate a level. India is inaccurately perceived as a failed developmental model because of a misspecification of the level of analysis. Under a common interventionist regime, some subnational provinces proved to be high performers. A two level interactive model posits that the policy framework of growth in India is not centrally guided but is a joint product of central rules, provincial strategic choices, and subnational institutional variation.

The four books reviewed in this article represent attempts to explain the process of postcommunist economic reform in ways that go beyond simple appeals to political will. Focusing their analyses on Russia, they exhibit a striking consensus on the broad outlines of transformation, but they differ starkly in how they identify and analyze the actors, interests, constraints, and opportunities at work. Comparison of the arguments’ strengths and weaknesses shows how scholars can build on recent insights into the identity and resources of major players in postcommunist reforms, the nature of institutional change, and the role of the state in economic restructuring.