Volume 35, Number 2, January 2003

Once taken as primordial givens, ethnic groups are now recognized to be historical constructions. The structure of ethnic cleavages needs to be viewed similarly. The contemporary landscape of linguistic divisions in Zambia, including the number of groups it contains, their relative sizes, and their spatial distribution, can be traced to specific policies implemented by the Northern Rhodesian colonial administration and its missionary and mining company allies. The structure of ethnic cleavages is a heretofore overlooked legacy of colonialism.

Senegal has been at the forefront of democratization in Africa and has consequently increased the representation of political minorities. Despite the growing presence of Senegalese women in elected office, they continue to confront many political obstacles, including exclusion from positions of influence within state and party structures and lack of resources to mobilize support. While these difficulties may be attributed to gendered conceptions of political leadership, democratic reforms have also not altered the patrimonial nature of politics and the structural constraints it imposes on the political participation of women. Women have therefore had marginal access to the hidden public of patronage networks.

Why have ethnic, national, and religious identities not led to violent conflict in Central Asia? Why and when are some identities more salient than others? Although identity has been highlighted as a critical variable in postcommunist transitions, few studies have examined the social roots of identity or asked how identity affects transitional stability or conflict. In the Central Asian countries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan, clan networks both foster social stability and deter ethnonational or religious conflict. However, clans also define the fault lines of instability and conflict.

Accountability in legislative representation carries implications for the relationship between legislators and constituents regarding communication, information, responsiveness, and the potential for punishment. There is an inherent tension between party discipline and responsiveness by individual legislators to their constituents. Recent institutional reforms in Latin America have sought to increase individual responsiveness of legislators, even at the expense of party discipline. The most important are mixed electoral systems combining single member districts with proportional representation and public voting in legislatures.

Judges who lack independence are not automatically subservient to the government of the day. Analysis of the separation of powers can explain why, when, and in which types of cases judges who lack secure tenure strategically defect from the government by ruling against it when it violates the rule of law. This theoretical framework explains a number of otherwise puzzling decisions handed down by the Argentine supreme court in the 1990s. In a context of democratic consolidation, the scope of the court’s defection was reduced but not eliminated.

Recent studies of postcommunist democracy illustrate how the states of East-Central Europe have overcome Leninist social, economic, and political legacies with varying degrees of success. Stark differences in outcomes have led to a more subtle understanding of Leninist legacies. The empirical findings of the three books under review also suggest that the positive influences of Leninist institutions and developmental policies on postcommunist politics should also be considered. Research would also benefit from examination of the unintended external consequences of Leninism, especially the institutions and ideology of a unified Europe, in accounting for the relative success of the states of East-Central Europe in the 1990s.