Academia and policy worlds consider the skill-based discrimination of migrants at entry as legitimate and unproblematic. Yet, the apparently neutral criterion of “skills” is under increasing scrutiny and, we contend, rightly so: its blurriness is impractical for comparative purposes and conceals that selection endures after immigration. With a new dataset encompassing thirty diverse states from Asia, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean, we examine how entry regulations connect to immigrant rights and access to permanent residence. We identify four clusters of countries displaying varying relations of immigration selections at entry with packages of rights and the possibility to settle, thereby largely defining the trajectories that are possible for different categories of migrant workers. Variation matters: some states carefully select by “skills” at entry and control access to rights, but several others provide fairly equal rights to ample groups of migrants regardless of skills.

Why has Japan failed to fulfill the mission of its 2005 postal privatization legislation? The answer is informal institutions that empower the postmasters within the electoral system and facilitate the mobilization of elites on behalf of anti-reformist goals. To support this claim, I analyze three such institutions: the postmasters’ ownership of postal facilities; the re-employment of former bureaucrats by the postal system and of top postal employees elsewhere in the system; and sales and vote-mobilization quotas. Theoretically, this study analyzes four sources of informal institutional resilience following formal institutional change: the heretofore understudied participation of officialdom in the introduction, communication, and enforcement of informal institutions; the establishment of such institutions prior to new formal rules; institutional duplication across economic sectors; and institutional complementarities.

There is extensive research about how bureaucracies in the developing world depart from the Weberian ideal and the ways in which corruption distorts the provision of public services. However, less is known about how citizens respond to the corruption they encounter in daily life. In this study, we implement a conjoint experiment to investigate how citizens evaluate different forms of corruption in the public sector. We find that they prefer “speed money” corrupt bureaucrats and reject “petty theft” corrupt bureaucrats when seeking a government service. In addition, this preference for “speed money” is not more salient among citizens who perceive the bureaucracy as inefficient. Instead, those who can afford to pay bribes are more accepting of bureaucratic corruption.

This article examines how previously excluded social actors transform democratic institutions that offer limited, subordinated inclusion. It introduces the concept of “conversion from below,” which refers to endogenous institutional change driven by historically marginalized groups. By comparing three indigenous mobilizations aimed at broadening Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation and Consent (FPIC), the article demonstrates that institutional changes from below occur when there is ambiguity in the definition of the institution; this ambiguity can be exploited in favorable venues and when groups can signal their disruptive power. This study enhances our understanding of endogenous institutional change and sheds light on the dynamics of engagement and resistance of newly included groups with inclusionary institutions in Latin America.

Under what conditions can the Left become electorally competitive in exclusionary contexts where actors championing redistribution face barriers to entry? We argue that leftist parties can significantly increase electoral support during inclusionary institutional openings, such as peace processes, when previously excluded grassroots actors find new spaces to mobilize for redistribution. By engaging in hinge institutions—non-binding, nationwide platforms—grassroots movements strengthen their organizational and ideational endowments, becoming potent brokers for heretofore weak leftist parties. Using a difference-in-differences design and a novel database on citizen proposals to the Colombian peace table, we show that grassroots mobilization mainly increases the Left’s vote share in post-accord presidential elections at the municipal level. We unpack the mechanisms through in-depth interviews with key actors and party manifesto analysis.

This study explores the transition from patrimonial structures to the inclusion of ordinary citizens in public office, focusing on Swedish state-building. Analyzing newly collected data on 1,351 civil servants, the research reveals how the demand for competence led to the adoption of meritocratic recruitment starting in the seventeenth century. This shift contributed to Sweden’s elimination of systemic corruption by the nineteenth century. Key factors in this transition include the increasing complexity of public administration tasks, which drove education policies; the ennoblement of individuals to broaden the pool of qualified personnel; and tensions within the expanded noble class. Conceptualized as “administrative democratization,” this process initially enhanced competence at lower ranks and progressively empowered ordinary citizens in senior positions, underscoring education’s role in developing effective public administration.

Political scientists have historically viewed smallholder farmers in low-income countries as lacking the capacity to collectively oppose adverse policies. This article argues that they can if they are able to attribute price distortions to government action. Apart from direct taxes, however, this is likely to occur only when traders inform smallholders of unfavorable policies. When traders are also significantly harmed by a price-distorting policy (e.g., by an export ban), they are motivated to use their networks and financial resources to inform farmer protest. When traders can pass on price distortions to farmers (as with low export taxes), they will not. The article probes this argument through a controlled comparative case analysis of export bans and taxes on raw cashew nuts in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.

Authoritarian leaders frequently send mixed messages about law. While official rhetoric typically emphasizes obeying law, leaders have proven willing to sidestep the law when it proves inconvenient. We explore the impact of this duality on the attitudes of Russian citizens, drawing on three rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. To identify the separate effects of cohort, age, and survey year, we use existing estimates of a function relating age to the predisposition to form new attitudes. Our results indicate that one factor driving Russians’ attitudes on law-abiding is the strength of the Kremlin’s messaging on the importance of obeying the law especially in their formative years. This effect would have been strongest for the oldest Russians. Yet, ceteris paribus, more years lived in Russia lead to declines in law-abiding attitudes. The net result of these two effects is that older Russians profess greater law abidingness. Putin’s emphasis on obeying the laws on the books has left its mark in the increasing prevalence of law-abiding attitudes.

Why do most authoritarian regimes installed by populist chief executives not become full-scale, repressive dictatorships? As explanation, scholars argue that populist leaders base their rule on charismatic appeal and voluntary mass support; therefore, they do not need harsh coercion, which would undermine their popular legitimacy. While corroborating this argument, I highlight a crucial complementary factor: populist chief executives find it difficult to marshal large-scale political repression. After all, their insistence on personalistic autonomy and unconstrained predominance creates tension with the military institution, the mainstay of organized coercion. Due to this inherent distance, most populist rulers lack the dependable military support to sustain the imposition of harsh autocracy. I substantiate these arguments with relevant cases from contemporary Latin America, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, and Peru.

Speechmaking is a vital resource for legislators and holds particular importance for women lawmakers, who frequently constitute a numerical minority and face constraints on their political influence. We argue that formal and informal institutions, district characteristics, and issue priorities shape women’s speech participation. Analyzing twenty-eight years of speeches from Chile’s Chamber of Deputies, we first show that women’s speeches constitute a small share of all speeches, directly corresponding to their numeric representation. Proportionally, however, women are over/under-represented in speechmaking across different policy areas. After controlling for various factors correlating with gender, including committee assignments, tenure, and district characteristics, women’s relative participation is similar to men’s in most topics but exceeds men’s in areas that disproportionately affect women’s lives, reflecting their commitment to substantive representation.

How do facilitating mechanisms affect the share of women in parliament? Specifically, is there an ideal combination of quota types and facilitating mechanisms that leads to greater female representation in parliament? This research uses a comprehensive dataset covering 186 countries in 2021 to provide a global landscape of the gender quota types and their facilitating mechanisms. Employing the OLS regression, we identified positive associations between placement mandates and strong sanctions and women’s parliamentary presence in legislative candidate system. In contrast, financial incentives under the reserved seat system showed a negative association. Our country-level analysis reveals that female aspirants face multifaceted challenges, suggesting that multiple issues should be addressed for financial incentives to effectively improve female representation.

Research in conflict studies comparing nonviolent and violent collective action has gained widespread attention due to the counterintuitive finding that nonviolent movements succeed more often than armed movements. However, rising repression and authoritarianism worldwide, alongside declining success rates for protest movements, highlight the need to further theorize and test the conditions under which nonviolent action succeeds. This article distills the different logics by which excluded minorities are advantaged or disadvantaged in nonviolent action. It also reviews three new books that advance the field of movement effectiveness in the short and long runs, and that demonstrate that success is context-dependent, with few characteristics universally conferring advantage or disadvantage. We conclude by outlining areas for future research, including the role of digital technologies.

Under what conditions do land transfers occur under land reform? Theories of land redistribution focus on demand-side explanations for land transfers where the state allocates land in exchange for support from voters or rural elites. In this article, I argue that land transfers under market land redistribution are driven by supply-side characteristics of landholders. Using the case of South Africa’s sugar sector, I show that landholders chose to sell their land via redistribution when they had the economic incentive to preserve existing state-support frameworks and had collective capacity from centralized institutions. To understand when and why land redistribution occurs, one must pay attention to the landholders’ relationship to the state and their internal sectoral organization. In some cases, landholders may have an incentive to redistribute their land.

This article sheds new light on the drivers of bureaucratic resilience in the face of presidential attacks, an understudied but politically salient topic. Scholars have long shown how political advocacy can protect bureaucracies from presidential attacks on policy regulation. We argue, however, that advocacy is insufficient to defend bureaucracies against attacks on policy implementation, which occurs largely outside the formal political arena. Through a case study of Brazil’s successful Covid-19 vaccination campaign, we call attention to two additional forms of support for agencies under attack—resource provision and social activism—that come into play during the implementation phase of policy. In conjunction with political advocacy, resource provision and social activism bolster bureaucracies under attack by filling in where other forms of support fall short.

What factors predispose an individual to engage in protest? Previous studies argue pre-existing social institutions provide the social capital and resource mobilization that facilitate collective action and protest movements, but less work has examined how this social capital and resource capacity develops. Utilizing more than 200,000 individuals surveyed across eighteen Latin American countries from the years 2002 through 2018, this study finds institutional decentralization by the Catholic Church is positively associated with individual propensities to engage in protest. Catholic decentralization is theorized to overcome free rider problems and enable the development of grassroots social capital and resources that empower collective action.

Governments’ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non-compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non-compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens’ non-compliance preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non-compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.

Cooperation with supportive societal organizations has been shown to help states implement policies. This article demonstrates that opposed organizations can also play this role, lending their resources in exchange for inducements (induced coproduction). Whether these organizations accept those inducements is a function of their preferences regarding the policy’s goals and implementation process. Inducements can overcome opposition to the latter but are less likely to respond to concerns about the former. Examining the subnational implementation of an education reform in Mexico, I show that opposition to goals predicts which teachers’ union locals rejected offered inducements. A paired comparison of two most similar Mexican states illustrates how opposition to goals results in a rejection of inducements (Oaxaca), as well as how induced coproduction results in implementation (Coahuila).

A vast scholarship shows that social movements can play pivotal roles in bringing about policies that benefit marginalized groups. However, the role of social movements in entrenching those policies—ensuring they take root—remains insufficiently studied. We set a research agenda for the study of how social movements shape policy entrenchment by calling attention to three commonly used strategies—occupying state bureaucracies, engaging in pressure and persuasion tactics, and building alliances with political parties—and analyzing the relationships among them. We illustrate these strategies through short case studies of social movements that achieved significant change benefitting marginalized groups in Latin America: the health movement in Brazil, the unemployed workers’ movements in Argentina, and peasant and indigenous movements in Bolivia.

In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our theory using China’s Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–1959), a repressive campaign launched by Mao Zedong against alleged critics of his rule. We find that officials who were former undercover partisans, a faction considered untrustworthy by Mao, tended to prosecute more “rightists” in their jurisdictions and imposed harsher penalties on them. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the motivations of coercive agents.

A rich literature examines the determinants of income inequality. Less is known about the distribution of income composition, or the extent to which different socio-economic groups hold different sources of income. This article explores the drivers of income composition inequality
(ICI). Contrary to recent studies, which show that the composition of government has ceased to shape redistribution and income inequality dynamics, this article posits that left-wing parties are associated with lower income composition inequality. We test this expectation with data from thirty European countries between 2003 and 2017. Our results suggest that the polarization between capital and labor income holders declines under left-wing governments. We establish that this is mainly because left-wing parties seek to broaden access to capital income.

Which autocratic elites are more likely to be punished after being removed from office? Purges are an important tool of autocratic survival, helping dictators to eliminate potential rivals. However, expulsion is not always the end for victims, as some also suffer detention or execution. Although we have compelling theories on why certain elites are purged, we still lack strong understanding of why punishments may differ. Using individual-level data on autocratic elites from communist Eastern Europe between 1917–1991, I find evidence that military and internal security elites are more likely to be detained than civilians, owing to the higher coup risk they pose. Internal security elites are also more likely to be executed than other elites, due to long-term threats of their professional knowledge.

Since the 1990s, seventeen African states have added a second chamber to their legislatures. This sudden trend is puzzling for two reasons. First, bicameral legislatures have decreased by 33 percent worldwide. Second, although upper houses often aim to improve democratic representation, descriptive statistics suggest these institutional changes were not due to democratic or representative pressures. The changes occurred primarily in hybrid regimes. What explains this resurgence of bicameral legislatures in Africa? I argue that incumbents introduce a second chamber when the opposition has sufficient power in the lower chamber to contain the executive branch. I adopt a mixed-methods approach combining statistical analysis and two case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. I find that African incumbents have created a second chamber to (1) weaken the legislature as a whole and the opposition in particular and (2) manage intra-party dissent.

Extant theories posit that political conflict affords favorable circumstances for successful party building. However, crises do not necessarily engender the emergence of new parties with the capacity to integrate discontent. In this in-depth analysis of Chile, we show how lowering barriers to entry inadvertently precluded the development of a national political organization. We describe the nature of new political actors who emerged from the cycle of protest that erupted in October 2019. Our analysis shows that the traits of the umbrellas of lists of independents conditioned the ability of emerging actors to aggregate demands of different districts. The Chilean case illustrates how a cycle of protest can engender new, electorally successful political actors but does not assure these actors’ capacity to legitimate the political process.

Research in comparative politics on informal institutions can be grouped into analysis of norms and values within government institutions and studies of self-governance in communities that are relatively isolated from states. Three recent books by Nadya Hajj, Shelby Grossman, and David Skarbek advance this research agenda by showing that self-governance can be significant even in contexts where the state is present, including refugee camps, markets in urban settings, and in prisons. They also offer abundant insights into how to overcome challenges with measuring and analyzing informal institutions. Rather than prioritize private or public governance, the authors see these as imperfect alternatives that invite analysis of why private governance works better in some contexts than in others for communities seeking to improve their lives in challenging circumstances.