Volume 57, Number 1, October 2024

Alex Dyzenhaus, Sweetening the Deal: The Political Economy of Land Redistribution in South Africa’s Sugar Sector

Under what conditions do land transfers occur under land reform? Theories of land redistribution focus on demand-side explanations for land transfers where the state allocates land in exchange for support from voters or rural elites. In this article, I argue that land transfers under market land redistribution are driven by supply-side characteristics of landholders. Using the case of South Africa’s sugar sector, I show that landholders chose to sell their land via redistribution when they had the economic incentive to preserve existing state-support frameworks and had collective capacity from centralized institutions. To understand when and why land redistribution occurs, one must pay attention to the landholders’ relationship to the state and their internal sectoral organization. In some cases, landholders may have an incentive to redistribute their land.

Jessica A.J. Rich, Elize Massard da Fonseca, and Liam Bower, What Makes Bureaucracies Politically Resilient? Evidence from Brazil's Covid-19 Vaccination Campaign

This article sheds new light on the drivers of bureaucratic resilience in the face of presidential attacks, an understudied but politically salient topic. Scholars have long shown how political advocacy can protect bureaucracies from presidential attacks on policy regulation. We argue, however, that advocacy is insufficient to defend bureaucracies against attacks on policy implementation, which occurs largely outside the formal political arena. Through a case study of Brazil’s successful Covid-19 vaccination campaign, we call attention to two additional forms of support for agencies under attack—resource provision and social activism—that come into play during the implementation phase of policy. In conjunction with political advocacy, resource provision and social activism bolster bureaucracies under attack by filling in where other forms of support fall short.

Christopher W. Hale, Resource Mobilization, Social Capital, Religion, and Protest across Latin America

What factors predispose an individual to engage in protest? Previous studies argue pre-existing social institutions provide the social capital and resource mobilization that facilitate collective action and protest movements, but less work has examined how this social capital and resource capacity develops. Utilizing more than 200,000 individuals surveyed across eighteen Latin American countries from the years 2002 through 2018, this study finds institutional decentralization by the Catholic Church is positively associated with individual propensities to engage in protest. Catholic decentralization is theorized to overcome free rider problems and enable the development of grassroots social capital and resources that empower collective action.

Amanda Driscoll, Aylin Aydin-Cakir, and Susanne Schorpp, Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non-Compliance with High Court Decisions

Governments’ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non-compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non-compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens’ non-compliance preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non-compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.

Julia Smith Coyoli, Inducing Coproduction: Policy Implementation and Teachers

Cooperation with supportive societal organizations has been shown to help states implement policies. This article demonstrates that opposed organizations can also play this role, lending their resources in exchange for inducements (induced coproduction). Whether these organizations accept those inducements is a function of their preferences regarding the policy’s goals and implementation process. Inducements can overcome opposition to the latter but are less likely to respond to concerns about the former. Examining the subnational implementation of an education reform in Mexico, I show that opposition to goals predicts which teachers’ union locals rejected offered inducements. A paired comparison of two most similar Mexican states illustrates how opposition to goals results in a rejection of inducements (Oaxaca), as well as how induced coproduction results in implementation (Coahuila).

Santiago Anria, Candelaria Garay, and Jessica A.J. Rich, Social Movements and Policy Entrenchment

A vast scholarship shows that social movements can play pivotal roles in bringing about policies that benefit marginalized groups. However, the role of social movements in entrenching those policies—ensuring they take root—remains insufficiently studied. We set a research agenda for the study of how social movements shape policy entrenchment by calling attention to three commonly used strategies—occupying state bureaucracies, engaging in pressure and persuasion tactics, and building alliances with political parties—and analyzing the relationships among them. We illustrate these strategies through short case studies of social movements that achieved significant change benefitting marginalized groups in Latin America: the health movement in Brazil, the unemployed workers’ movements in Argentina, and peasant and indigenous movements in Bolivia.
Volume 57, Number 1, October 20242025-07-02T17:29:00+00:00

Volume 56, Issue 4, July 2024

Jingyuan Qian and Steve Bai, Loyalty Signaling, Bureaucratic Compliance, and Variation in State Repression in Authoritarian Regimes

In autocracies, why are certain bureaucrats more heavy-handed in their use of force than others during repression? In this article, we propose an incentive-compatible theory that explains the uneven compliance of bureaucrats in repressive campaigns. We argue that bureaucrats from less trusted backgrounds tend to implement repressive tasks more fervently to credibly display loyalty and bolster their career prospects. We provide evidence for our theory using China’s Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957–1959), a repressive campaign launched by Mao Zedong against alleged critics of his rule. We find that officials who were former undercover partisans, a faction considered untrustworthy by Mao, tended to prosecute more “rightists” in their jurisdictions and imposed harsher penalties on them. This study contributes to the literature by revealing the motivations of coercive agents.

Bilyana Petrova and Marco Ranaldi, Determinants of Income Composition Inequality

A rich literature examines the determinants of income inequality. Less is known about the distribution of income composition, or the extent to which different socio-economic groups hold different sources of income. This article explores the drivers of income composition inequality
(ICI). Contrary to recent studies, which show that the composition of government has ceased to shape redistribution and income inequality dynamics, this article posits that left-wing parties are associated with lower income composition inequality. We test this expectation with data from thirty European countries between 2003 and 2017. Our results suggest that the polarization between capital and labor income holders declines under left-wing governments. We establish that this is mainly because left-wing parties seek to broaden access to capital income.

Austin S. Matthews, Elite Threats and Punitive Violence in Autocratic Regimes: Evidence from Communist Eastern Europe

Which autocratic elites are more likely to be punished after being removed from office? Purges are an important tool of autocratic survival, helping dictators to eliminate potential rivals. However, expulsion is not always the end for victims, as some also suffer detention or execution. Although we have compelling theories on why certain elites are purged, we still lack strong understanding of why punishments may differ. Using individual-level data on autocratic elites from communist Eastern Europe between 1917–1991, I find evidence that military and internal security elites are more likely to be detained than civilians, owing to the higher coup risk they pose. Internal security elites are also more likely to be executed than other elites, due to long-term threats of their professional knowledge.

Thalia Gerzso, A Two-Headed Creature: Bicameralism in African Autocracies

Since the 1990s, seventeen African states have added a second chamber to their legislatures. This sudden trend is puzzling for two reasons. First, bicameral legislatures have decreased by 33 percent worldwide. Second, although upper houses often aim to improve democratic representation, descriptive statistics suggest these institutional changes were not due to democratic or representative pressures. The changes occurred primarily in hybrid regimes. What explains this resurgence of bicameral legislatures in Africa? I argue that incumbents introduce a second chamber when the opposition has sufficient power in the lower chamber to contain the executive branch. I adopt a mixed-methods approach combining statistical analysis and two case studies of Côte d’Ivoire and Zimbabwe. I find that African incumbents have created a second chamber to (1) weaken the legislature as a whole and the opposition in particular and (2) manage intra-party dissent.

Lihuen Nocetto, Verónica Pérez-Bentancur, Rafael Piñeiro-Rodríguez, and Fernando Rosenblatt, Unorganized Politics: The Political Aftermath of Social Unrest in Chile

Extant theories posit that political conflict affords favorable circumstances for successful party building. However, crises do not necessarily engender the emergence of new parties with the capacity to integrate discontent. In this in-depth analysis of Chile, we show how lowering barriers to entry inadvertently precluded the development of a national political organization. We describe the nature of new political actors who emerged from the cycle of protest that erupted in October 2019. Our analysis shows that the traits of the umbrellas of lists of independents conditioned the ability of emerging actors to aggregate demands of different districts. The Chilean case illustrates how a cycle of protest can engender new, electorally successful political actors but does not assure these actors’ capacity to legitimate the political process.

Ilia Murtazashvili and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Review Article, Informal Institutions in Comparative Politics

Research in comparative politics on informal institutions can be grouped into analysis of norms and values within government institutions and studies of self-governance in communities that are relatively isolated from states. Three recent books by Nadya Hajj, Shelby Grossman, and David Skarbek advance this research agenda by showing that self-governance can be significant even in contexts where the state is present, including refugee camps, markets in urban settings, and in prisons. They also offer abundant insights into how to overcome challenges with measuring and analyzing informal institutions. Rather than prioritize private or public governance, the authors see these as imperfect alternatives that invite analysis of why private governance works better in some contexts than in others for communities seeking to improve their lives in challenging circumstances.
Volume 56, Issue 4, July 20242025-07-02T17:29:11+00:00

Welcome to the Journal of Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics, an international journal presenting scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and processes,communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, students, and public and NGO officials. The journal is indispensable to experts in universities, research organizations, foundations, embassies, and policymaking agencies throughout the world. 

Read the journal online here.

A New Era of Editorial Leadership at Comparative Politics

With the first issue of the 58th volume of Comparative Politics, we mark a change in the guard of the leadership of the journal. After more than 45 years of service as members of the editorial committee at Comparative Politics and after 30 years of service as the journal’s Editors-in-Chief, Professors Kenneth Paul Erickson and Irving Leonard Markovitz are stepping down. Both Ken and Lenny, as we know them, have shown extraordinary dedication to the journal and, more generally, to the field of comparative politics. They have modeled integrity, collegiality, hard work, and a commitment to excellence. They have kept the journal strong. Thanks to their leadership, CP is ranked as Q1 among all Political Science journals, while remaining among a handful of independent publications in the industry. We are so grateful to them.

With the approval of the editorial committee, Professors Erickson and Markovitz have passed the baton to Professors Eva Bellin and Nicholas Rush Smith who will now assume the role of Editors-in-Chief. Both Bellin and Smith are committed to making the journal the strongest it can be – a platform for path-breaking research in comparative politics, open to all methods. But we are especially committed to sustaining the journal’s long-standing role as an outlet for excellent qualitative research that explores ambitious theoretical questions in politics, whether that research be rooted in comparative historical analysis, small-n analysis, process tracing, in-depth interviews, or ethnographic field work. We are also dedicated to being a journal that fosters emerging scholars by providing a quick initial decision, high-quality feedback on papers sent out for review, and fair consideration of work submitted by all scholars regardless of their academic rank or institution. Professors Erickson and Markovitz helped launch the publishing careers of many scholars in the discipline and we hope to carry on that legacy. This will be our tribute to our exemplars, Ken and Lenny.

Welcome to the Journal of Comparative Politics2025-10-03T16:59:52+00:00

Volume 56, Issue 3, April 2025

Pearce Edwards, Religious Leaders and Resistance to Repression: The Bishops Opposed to Argentina’s Dirty War

Can religious leaders who oppose state violence reduce its use? Communal elites, such as religious leaders, may oppose human rights violations. This article argues that these leaders, part of institutions embedded in local communities and with influence based on traditional power, reduce repression when they oppose dictatorships. The argument’s main implication is tested in Argentina during the Dirty War of its 1976–1983 military dictatorship, using original archival data on the country’s Catholic bishops. Opposed bishops are associated with reduced disappearances and killings. A variety of evidence is consistent with opposed bishops taking two types of actions to resist repression: assisting likeminded local agents and participating in human rights advocacy campaigns. The findings point to the importance of influential civil society actors in reducing state violence.

Mariana Giusti-Rodríguez, Shaping Ethnoracial Identities: State-Society Relations and Programmatic Differentiation in the Andes

Under what circumstances do ethnoracial groups become programmatically differentiated? This article argues that ethnoracial programmatic differentiation results from major transformations in groups’ access to state power. Access to state power conditions ethnoracial groups’ perceptions of the state and their support for state-centric programmatic policies. As historically-excluded groups gain access to power, and historically-advantaged ones lose theirs, programmatic differentiation increases, the product of shifting relationships with the state. I evaluate this argument using survey data from the Andean region and demonstrate that ethnoracial groups have become programmatically differentiated where the indigenous have recently gained political power, but not elsewhere despite widespread structural inequalities and extensive indigenous organizational capacity. The findings shed light on why ethnoracialized preferences vary across contexts in unexpected ways.

Calla Hummel and V. Ximena Velasco-Guachalla, Activists, Parties, and the Expansion of Trans Rights in Bolivia

Bolivia prohibits discrimination based on gender identity and passed a ground-breaking gender identity law. These laws had little support among voters and passed along with heteronormative measures. Why did activists succeed in proposing and passing legislation that most voters did not support? Why were Bolivia’s advances in LGBTQ+ rights accompanied by heteronormative laws? We argue that parties with deep ties to social movements are more likely to advance legislation that expands LGBTQ+ rights than other parties and that contradictory laws emerge where both organized religion and LGBTQ+ activists are party constituents. We describe how Bolivian trans activists leveraged their access to ruling party legislators, using interviews with activists and officials, and briefly discuss the cases of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Colombia.

Merete Bech Seeberg and Michael Wahman, How Does Primary Election Manipulation Affect the Selection of Women Candidates? Evidence from Malawi

How does manipulation of primary elections affect the selection of women candidates for parliament? The underrepresentation of women in politics is a well-researched global phenomenon. However, as most work focuses on general elections, we overlook the disadvantages that women face in the selection process. Specifically, primary elections often provide ample room for manipulation. We argue that manipulation skews electoral contests in favor of candidates with material and inter-personal resources, who are more likely to be men. We collect unique data via on-the-ground observation of 119 primary election rounds (featuring 316 aspirants) in Malawi’s 2019 parliamentary election and interview candidates to shed light on hitherto uninvestigated internal party primaries. We show that while women running in free and fair primaries were more likely to win nominations than men, their chances were substantially reduced where primaries were flawed. The quantitative findings are corroborated by qualitative accounts of the gendered effect of primary-day manipulation in party primaries. The results have implications for debates on descriptive representation, electoral integrity, and political parties.

Eleanor Knott, Ethnonationalism or a Financial-Criminal Incentive Structure? Explaining Elite Support in Crimea for Russia’s Annexation

Russia’s annexation of Crimea occurred after twenty years of relative peace and the apex (and failure) of pro-Russian sentiments within Crimea. Annexation is surprising for Putin’s willingness to pursue such risky actions, but also because it required elite support within Crimea. This article uses process tracing to test ethnonationalism in explaining support for Russia’s annexation against a rival explanation focusing on the role of criminality and crime (financial-criminal incentive structure). By exposing how and which elites defected in Crimea, the article demonstrates that elite breakage and realignments occurred within a financial-criminal incentive structure to motivate engagement in annexation. In turn, this article discusses its broader implications for understanding Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine and the politics of conflict, nationalism, and the wider former Soviet Union.

Elissa Berwick, Beyond Secession: Substate Nationalism and Support for Redistribution in Spain

This article explores how and why substate nationalism shapes support for redistribution. An experiment embedded in an original survey reveals that in Spanish regions with extensive substate nationalist mobilization, preferences for redistribution vary based on the proposed boundaries of redistribution. In this context, individuals have preferences regarding where redistribution will occur, and not just on how much there will be. The results provide the first micro-level evidence for how preferences for redistribution depend on the geographic boundaries of a proposed policy and why mobilized group identities interact with those preferences to determine support for redistribution. The findings suggest that substate nationalist mobilization has significant implications for policy preferences beyond secession.
Volume 56, Issue 3, April 20252025-07-02T17:29:46+00:00

Volume 56, Number 1, October 2023

Laia Balcells, Lesley-Ann Daniels, and Alexander Kuo, The “Weight” of Territorial Issues: Evidence from Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland

Territorial debates complicate the politics of the affected regions, as parties decide whether to compete on a territorial dimension alongside other longstanding important issues. Yet, empirical evidence is scarce regarding how much voters politically weigh territorial issues against others. We theorize that in contexts when such issues are salient, they have a greater weight relative to others due to their identity-oriented nature. We present evidence from conjoint experiments from three European regions with active territorial debates: Catalonia, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. We find that territorial preferences matter more than others for candidate choice, as the reward (punishment) of congruent (incongruent) candidates is greater, and individuals are less willing to trade off on this issue. Our results have comparative implications for political competition in multidimensional spaces.

Fabio Resmini, Will the Revolution Be Televised? Party Organization, Media Activism, and the Communication Strategies of Left-Wing Governments in Latin America

How do parties respond to media environments slanted against them? This article exploits variation in the level of media activism of Latin American left-wing governments to answer this question. I argue that the composition of governing parties’ bases of support shapes their communication strategy. While parties with unorganized supporters lack societal channels of communication with the electorate and are forced to resort to alternative media structures to disseminate information, parties with organized supporters communicate through affiliated societal organizations and do not depend on mediatized communication. To illustrate this theory, I process trace the cases of Ecuador and Bolivia, drawing on seventy original interviews with key decisionmakers. This article contributes to the literature on political parties by highlighting the overlooked communication function they fulfill.

Heather-Leigh K. Ba, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, and Yu Bin Kim, Authoritarian Audiences: Theory and Evidence for Subnational Propaganda Targeting in North Korea

We argue that authoritarian regimes engage in subnational propaganda targeting in pursuit of political survival. Drawing on an original dataset of propaganda collected inside North Korea, we show that the regime tailors messaging to elites and masses differently. We outline a schema of strategies and themes that authoritarian regimes utilize when crafting propaganda, theorize variations in their use, and test these variations empirically, using qualitative analysis, regression, and text analysis. We demonstrate that the North Korean regime targets Pyongyang-based elites with co-optational messages promising economic benefit, while the masses receive mobilizational messages focused on agricultural productivity. North Korean propaganda also legitimates the regime differently based on audience: messages to elites reassure them of their privileged status but messages to the masses remind them of why their sacrifices are necessary.

Charles Hankla, Felix Rioja, and Neven Valev, The Political Economy of “Green” Regulation: Evidence from Fuel Price Markets

The world price of oil is in constant flux, but countries respond to this reality in very different ways. Some heavily regulate the degree to which world prices “pass-through” to the price of gasoline at the pump, while others let domestic gasoline prices track world markets. We develop a novel, weekly dataset—to our knowledge the most comprehensive in existence—to explore the political economy of pass-through policies in over 100 countries. We find that autocracies are more likely than democracies to limit pass-through, especially those that are weakly institutionalized, ineffective providers of public services, and neo-patrimonial. Our project sheds light on the domestic policy choices that affect climate change and has significant implications for understanding price regulation more broadly.

Samantha A. Vortherms, Dividing the People: The Authoritarian Bargain, Development, and Authoritarian Citizenship

Autocrats must redistribute to survive, but redistribution is limited and selective. Who is entitled to redistribution underlying the authoritarian bargain? I argue redistribution is a question of citizenship. Autocrats use citizenship institutions, especially particularistic membership, to strategically limit and extend socio-economic rights to ensure both security and economic development. I apply this framework to China, where control over particularistic membership decentralized in conjunction with development strategies. Drawing on semi-structured interviews, government policies, and a database of local citizenship policies in China, I trace how local citizenship creates closure while economic development incentivizes strategic inclusion. By evaluating how authoritarian citizenship functions, this framework increases our understanding of individual-state relations in autocratic contexts.
Volume 56, Number 1, October 20232025-07-02T17:30:13+00:00
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